When President Ford presented his 1976 defense budget to the Congress in January 1975, the Administration stressed the need to reverse what it described as a 10-year trend of declining U.S. military capabilities relative to those of the U.S.S.R. As a consequence, the President requested an appropriation of $105 billion for the Department of Defense, an increase of 15 percent over the previous year. About half of this increase was simply to offset the effect of inflation. The other half, however, was to fund the first-year costs of a continuing program to increase the size of conventional forces and to expand nuclear capabilities at a fairly rapid rate.
When President Ford presented his 1976 defense budget to the Congress in January 1975, the Administration stressed the need to reverse what it described as a 10-year trend of declining U.S. military capabilities relative to those of the U.S.S.R. As a consequence, the President requested an appropriation of $105 billion for the Department of Defense, an increase of 15 percent over the previous year. About half of this increase was simply to offset the effect of inflation. The other half, however, was to fund the first-year costs of a continuing program to increase the size of conventional forces and to expand nuclear capabilities at a fairly rapid rate.
After an extensive review of the defense budget, the Congress in November 1975 reduced the request by approximately $7.5 billion on an annual basis, or in other words roughly the amount necessary to keep defense expenditures constant in real terms, that is, adjusted for inflation. These cuts, however, were applied in such a way as to trim a very large number of individual defense expenditure categories, while halting very few programs. Thus, consciously or not, the Congress, despite the cuts, continued to lend support to the Administration's plans to expand military forces.
Should these plans be carried out over the future, the defense budget in real terms would increase by more than four percent a year over the rest of this decade. By 1980 military spending would be about $115 billion in dollars of today's purchasing power, and still trending upward. Put another way, it now seems likely that military spending will continue to absorb about one-fourth of the total federal budget and roughly six percent of total national output for the indefinite future. And even this prospect depends on the international environment staying pretty much in its present fairly equable state. Should foreign relations take a sharp turn for the worse, requirements for defense spending could rise even more rapidly.
One would think that the nation would set off on such a course only after the most thorough deliberation. Yet, curiously enough, the annual debate about whether the military's share of the nation's resources is too big, just right, or too small, hardly measures up to the costs involved or the importance of the underlying military and political issues.
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The United States Navy has become the most unsettled of all the uniformed services, its role and capability in fulfilling national strategy clouded by controversy. In the past year, President Ford has sent two different shipbuilding requests to the Congress, to which the House and the Senate have added their own distinct and separate versions. Adding to the turmoil have been sharply varying perceptions of the Soviet naval threat. Many observers claim that significantly higher shipbuilding programs are needed due to the numerical and technological advances of the Soviet Navy. Others counter that the United States is more than holding its own in numbers of oceangoing warships, and that technological gains do not help Soviet fleets escape the geographical bottlenecks barring easy access to blue water.
Comparisons of the seagoing armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States are much in the news nowadays, and they are much in what happens behind the news. When our Secretary of State visits Moscow, or shuttles between capitals in Africa or the Middle East, he doubtless does not dwell on specific comparisons of military forces in his political talks, but the armed strength of our nation resonates in his words. Foreign policy transcends military capability, yet that capability tends to limit choices. Great wasteful wars have broken out in our century partly because of misperceived comparisons of armed forces. And war is as often a collapse as it is a continuation of foreign policy.

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