Two Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy: The United States and the European Balance
In November 1782, during the peace negotiations with Great Britain, John Adams talked with one of the British commissioners about the future relationship of the American republic with the European political system. In his diary he reproduced the exchange.
Gordon A. Craig is the J. E. Wallace Sterling Professor of Humanities in the Department of History at Stanford University, California. His most recent books include War, Politics and Diplomacy and Europe Since 1815.
In November 1782, during the peace negotiations with Great Britain, John Adams talked with one of the British commissioners about the future relationship of the American republic with the European political system. In his diary he reproduced the exchange.
"You are afraid," says Mr. Otis today, "of being made the tool of the powers of Europe." "Indeed I am," says I. "What powers?" said he. "All of them," said I. "It is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be continually maneuvering with us, to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. They will all wish to make of us a make-weight candle, when they are weighing out their pounds. Indeed, it is not surprising, for we shall very often, if not always, be able to turn the scale. But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle. . . ."
Adams was expressing what, in the course of the next 150 years, was to become an article of faith with many Americans, the belief that, having won its freedom from the old world, the American republic should have as little contact with it as possible. What other course was feasible, given the nature of the European system of politics? Regarded from this side of the Atlantic, it appeared to be animated by the whims of princes and the intrigues of diplomats and characterized by continual friction between its members, by an endless search for an equilibrium that was in reality neither attainable nor desired, and, intermittently, by wasting and destructive wars. It represented a perpetual menace to American liberties because its members were constantly seeking to involve the republic in their tangled affairs, and because American statesmen were not always as deaf as they should be to their seductions. Safety, therefore, lay in complete abstention from political contact with Europe...
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In recent months, many observers have concluded that the United States and Europe are on divergent paths and that the transatlantic alliance is crumbling. In spite of some real differences, however, American and European attitudes remain remarkably similar on most key issues. Basing policy on the false assumption of transatlantic divorce would only make it a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Seeks to transmute claims of US imperial decline into an agenda for its future role. Strategic doctrine should stress flexibility and the control of space, likened to control of the seas in times past. Areas of paramount geopolitical importance are (1) Eastern Europe and Germany (2) the Middle East (3) Central America, where a combination of anti-Yanqui nationalism and demography may even 'prompt a mood of panic' in the USA. The global role needs to be re-defined against parallels with other declining empires (Rome, Turkey) but also against lack of a successor -- "the Soviet Union will remain internally too weak to become a partner for peace and externally too strong to be satisfied with the status quo". Calls in particular for the upgrading to world status of the US-Japanese relationship -- 'Amerippon'. President Carter's security adviser, 1977-81. An excerpt was republished in 'Eastern Europe: a crisis in need of management' IHT 12 Apr 1988 p4.
Despite the myriad setbacks of recent months, the U.S.-European alliance is not doomed. But repairing it will require a strategic overhaul no less bold than that which followed the end of the Cold War. The key to today's transatlantic divide is not power but purpose. To revive and revamp the alliance, therefore, the United States and the European Union must forge a new grand strategy capable of meeting the great challenges of the era: expanding the Euro-Atlantic community and stabilizing the greater Middle East.

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