The United States stands at a crucial point in its relationship with the Soviet Union. George Kennan's latest prediction - widely echoed by other analysts - is that U.S. domestic reaction to the impending SALT II agreement will define a watershed in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I would argue that the continuity or disruption of the détente relationship will turn on issues going far beyond arms control alone, issues involving subjective considerations and beliefs about the origins and nature of Soviet strategic objectives and the impact of technology on the military balance.
Richard G. Head, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, is a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is co-editor of American Defense Policy (Third Edition), and other works. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Air Force or the Department of Defense.
The United States stands at a crucial point in its relationship with the Soviet Union. George Kennan's latest prediction - widely echoed by other analysts - is that U.S. domestic reaction to the impending SALT II agreement will define a watershed in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I would argue that the continuity or disruption of the détente relationship will turn on issues going far beyond arms control alone, issues involving subjective considerations and beliefs about the origins and nature of Soviet strategic objectives and the impact of technology on the military balance.
The military balance is not the only factor affecting the U.S.-Soviet political relationship. It may not even be the most important one. But it is not possible to discuss intelligently the overall relationship without due regard for the military component and the contribution that the technological element makes to national power.
The recent historical context of the U.S.-Soviet military relationship has been one of dynamic change. For at least the last 15 years the Soviet Union has invested heavily in military-related science and technology at the expense of investments in technology for all other sectors. At the same time, the Soviets have watched the United States divert its defense resources into Southeast Asia, defer service modernization programs and cut back on military research and development. During this period the Soviet Union has made great strides in exploiting technology for military purposes, has fundamentally altered the strategic balance by the deployment of large numbers of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and has dramatically improved the quality of its conventional forces. The purpose of this article is to examine some of the factors that determine where, how, and how well technology is being exploited to enhance military capabilities. Technology warrants particular consideration at this time, not only because of SALT II, but because there is widespread speculation that new weapons technology may be further altering both the strategic and theater aspects of the military balance.
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
After almost five years of breakthroughs, setbacks and mostly stalemate, the Soviet Union and the United States succeeded last September in agreeing on the outlines and some of the details of a new strategic arms limitation accord. Since then, several other details of the proposed SALT agreement have been ironed out. Although it is unclear whether the two sides will be able to complete a new agreement this year, the terms of the proposed accord have already triggered a wide-ranging debate in the United States and among allied states in Western Europe over whether its contents serve American security interests and those of the West as a whole.
By the early to mid-1980s, the United States will be unable to repose confidence in the ability of all save a small fraction of its silo-housed missile force to ride out a Soviet first nuclear strike. The possible implications of this early predictable development, and the policy choices that it poses for the U.S. government, are the subjects of this article.
Although President Nixon's goal of achieving an initial agreement at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) before the end of 1971 failed to be realized, it still appears likely that at least some limitations will be negotiated by the time that he and Premier Kosygin meet in Moscow in May. After SALT recessed in Vienna the President reported in his state of the world message on February ninth that a consensus is developing that there should be a treaty setting comprehensive limitations on anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and an interim agreement to freeze certain offensive arms.
