The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir
International competition and political action sometimes appear to be channeled between frail dikes. To put the thought another way, it is as if the seething mass of ambition and potential violence so characteristic of international relationships is contained in quieter times behind a thin shell of a veneer. Once the shell of constraint is broken, subsequent adventures become easier to contemplate. It is for some of these reasons that we should, perhaps, examine how the confines of restraint in Angola were broken through, and whether a different American policy in the period before the Soviet/Cuban intervention in 1975 might have produce a different result.
Nathaniel Davis is currently State Department Adviser at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. He was Ambassador to Chile in 1971-73, Director General of the Foreign Service in 1973-75. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in 1975, and Ambassador to Switzerland in 1976-77.
International competition and political action sometimes appear to be channeled between frail dikes. To put the thought another way, it is as if the seething mass of ambition and potential violence so characteristic of international relationships is contained in quieter times behind a thin shell of a veneer. Once the shell of constraint is broken, subsequent adventures become easier to contemplate. It is for some of these reasons that we should, perhaps, examine how the confines of restraint in Angola were broken through, and whether a different American policy in the period before the Soviet/Cuban intervention in 1975 might have produce a different result.
I served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the spring and summer of 1975, and this is essentially an account of my role during that time. In the January-February 1975 issue of Africa Report, Bruce Oudes wrote that "Davis reportedly was reluctant to assume the new position." He was right. I asked more than once that the appointment not be made. Although my African experience was greater than Mr. Oudes recognized in his article, a regional Assistant Secretary should have very impressive credentials in his geographic area of responsibility. Moreover, I knew that my service from October 1971 to October 1973 as U.S. Ambassador to Chile would complicate matters.1 Lastly, it was clear that the replacement of Donald B. Easum as Assistant Secretary would be widely interpreted as a U.S. withdrawal from Ambassador Easum's commitment to black African aspirations. I pointed out to Secretary of State Kissinger that I had sympathy for a number of Mr. Easum's views as I understood them, and was not confident that I could satisfy him where Easum apparently had not. The Secretary happened to be out of Washington when the question came to a head, and I telegraphed him, saying that the African Bureau was not a responsibility I would seek under the circumstances. However, Foreign Service officers are bound to accept discipline in assignments. In my telegram to the Secretary, I added, therefore, that I would do my best as chief of the African Bureau if the Secretary nonetheless asked me to discharge that assignment. He did, and the nomination was announced on January 8, 1975.
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
It was an improbable locus for a superpower collision. But the shape and location, if not the history and social reality, of Angola were being firmly impressed upon the minds of millions of American television viewers. At issue, they learned from the Secretary of State, testifying before a Senate subcommittee on African affairs, was this basic principle: "The Soviet Union must not be given any opportunity to use military forces for aggressive purposes without running the risk of conflict with us."1 Angola was to be the post-Vietnam testing ground of American will and power in the face of the global expansion of a bullish rival whose recently realized military outreach was seen to be leading it toward dangerous adventures.
Cuba's intervention in Africa has proved very costly. Its involvement in 17 countries and three insurgencies has caused economic drain, loss of life, and domestic discontent, although the political benefits of involvement in Angola have been great. Despite the rising human and financial cost of remaining there, Cuba will be loath to withdraw without some tangible and lasting achievement, such as Namibian independence.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.