The Years that the Locust Hath Eaten: Oil Policy and OPEC Development Prospects
For the last five years the world has been trying to cope with a set of problems triggered by the sudden oil price explosion of late 1973: the availability of oil to cover future energy demand, the economic and financial upheaval attending the jump in oil prices, and the utilization of a flood of petrodollars by OPEC countries for their national development and other purposes. These three issues are intimately interrelated and interact on each other; they can thus be properly assessed only in conjunction with each other.
Walter J. Levy is a consultant to industry and governments.
For the last five years the world has been trying to cope with a set of problems triggered by the sudden oil price explosion of late 1973: the availability of oil to cover future energy demand, the economic and financial upheaval attending the jump in oil prices, and the utilization of a flood of petrodollars by OPEC countries for their national development and other purposes. These three issues are intimately interrelated and interact on each other; they can thus be properly assessed only in conjunction with each other.
The relationship between oil supply and oil demand has always depended not only on trends in world oil discovery and consumption - including the impact of conservation and the progress made in developing additional energy sources - but on the price and production policies of major oil-producing countries, based in turn on calculations of their political and economic interests. The post-1974 upheaval in the economic and financial structures of the Western industrialized countries, and of the world as a whole, has been kept within controllable limits in part by an economic slowdown and the resourcefulness of Western public and private financial institutions - but certainly also because the principal OPEC countries were not then able or willing to cut production and to press their undoubted bargaining leverage to the utmost. Price advances by OPEC have not kept pace with the overall rate of inflation and the decline of the dollar since the fourfold price increases of 1974, and the real price of oil has dropped substantially. Meanwhile, the great bulk of the new oil money, or petrodollars, flowing to the OPEC countries has been soaked up, often through prodigious spending by these countries in the West. As a result, the shock to the industrialized economies has been cushioned, and the flow of petrodollars directly into the financial system - while itself enormously increased and the source of continuing major problems - has not turned out to be the nightmare many had feared in 1974.
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Predicts that oil prices will rise sharply in the 1990s, with "more bargaining leverage again falling into the hands of exporting countries". Whatever the outcome of the Kuwait crisis, OPEC will never be the same again. For French version, see Edward L Morse 'La révolution pétrolière à venir' Politique Étrangère 55/4 Winter 1990 pp793-798.
The United States recently "discovered" Mexico. Potential oil reserves of 200 billion barrels helped focus our attention and sparked interest in forging some kind of special relationship with our southern neighbor. Concrete proposals range from a North American Accord or Common Market to less dramatic package deals that would swap petroleum for increased Mexican access to U.S. markets.
From 1947 to 1973 the shift of power is exponential. In 1947 the United States ceased to be a net exporter of oil; the basing point for oil prices moved from the Gulf of Mexico to the Persian Gulf, and with it the underlying leverage. Although the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960, its membership was so disparate that at first it did little to exploit the shift. With prices low, U.S. dependence on imported energy grew to 14 percent of energy consumption in 1972. Europe's dependence on energy imports grew from 33 percent in 1960 to 65 percent in 1972; Japan's from 43 to 90 percent in the same period. By the late 1960s OPEC members were acting more masterfully to turn the increased dependence to advantage; prices began to move up. The 1973 October War revealed OPEC's full power.

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