Plutonium, Proliferation and the Price of Reprocessing
Europe and the United States have parted company on the question of reprocessing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, particularly as it applies to the separation and export of plutonium. The decisions to proceed with the construction of new plants at Windscale in Britain and La Hague in France, designed in large part to provide this service for non-nuclear-weapon countries, run counter to the U.S. conviction that restricting separation and trade in plutonium is essential, at least until more effective controls can be devised.
Victor Gilinsky has been a member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission since its creation in 1975, having worked previously on international nuclear matters at the Atomic Energy Commission and the Rand Corporation. He is a contributor to the forthcoming Nuclear Policies: Fuel Without the Bomb. This article is adapted from remarks presented at the Atomic Industrial Forum/British Nuclear Forum International Conference on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, held in London in September 1978.
Europe and the United States have parted company on the question of reprocessing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, particularly as it applies to the separation and export of plutonium. The decisions to proceed with the construction of new plants at Windscale in Britain and La Hague in France, designed in large part to provide this service for non-nuclear-weapon countries, run counter to the U.S. conviction that restricting separation and trade in plutonium is essential, at least until more effective controls can be devised.
History, unlike physics, does not allow for controlled experiments, so we may never know how things would have turned out had the British and French acceded to the American plea that a commitment to large-scale reprocessing be deferred. I do not propose here to rehash the arguments over whether these European decisions should have been taken. What I would like to do is to explore their implications for our common effort at control over the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
There is no disagreement among the United States, Britain and France that reprocessing plants in non-nuclear-weapon states should be discouraged. The British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, told Parliament during the Windscale debate that Britain had "never made such a sale, nor do we intend to do so." The recently reported mutual reexamination of a transaction involving the sale of reprocessing facilities by France to Pakistan is welcome news. There is disagreement among us, however, over whether provision of plutonium services for export helps the effort to contain proliferation.
The situation is not without its ironies: much of the spent fuel the United States hopes will not be reprocessed prematurely is in fact under its putative control. It is derived primarily from fuel supplied under agreements that require American approval for its reprocessing and for the subsequent return of plutonium to its owners. The granting of such approvals is subject to strict criteria under the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The law treats the European member countries of EURATOM as a single entity, and provides certain exemptions where U.S.-supplied fuel moves inside that community. Reprocessing carried out for non-EURATOM countries, however, is subject to an American veto.
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The overdramatized political and diplomatic reaction of Washington to the military aid which the U.S.S.R. and Cuba have given to Angola and Ethiopia and, in recent times, to the aid which the U.S.S.R. has offered Afghanistan, has been one of the major factors clouding Soviet-American relations in the last few years. Alluding not only to these events but also to the general support and assistance which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have been giving the Third World movements for national and social liberation, the American press has been claiming for years that while the United States and the Soviet Union seem to have agreed on stabilizing the world situation, the Soviet Union has been destabilizing it by its actions. In point of fact, the charge that the Soviet Union has "broken the rules of détente" in the developing world has been one of the main pretexts used by the Ford and Carter Administrations in domestic debates to try to justify their own abandonment of the policy of détente.
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