Once again we have reached a major turning point in American foreign policy. On this, at least, there is widespread agreement. The conviction that the nation has come to a critical juncture in its foreign relations is broadly shared by those who may disagree on virtually everything else. Everywhere the signs point to the conclusion that for the third time in the post-World War II period we are in the throes of far-reaching change in the nation's foreign policy. What these signs do not divulge are the eventual scope and magnitude of the change.
Robert W. Tucker is Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University, co-director of studies at The Lehrman Institute, and the author of The Inequality of Nations and other works. The author wishes to express his gratitude to David Hendrickson for his invaluable assistance in preparing this essay.
Once again we have reached a major turning point in American foreign policy. On this, at least, there is widespread agreement. The conviction that the nation has come to a critical juncture in its foreign relations is broadly shared by those who may disagree on virtually everything else. Everywhere the signs point to the conclusion that for the third time in the post-World War II period we are in the throes of far-reaching change in the nation's foreign policy. What these signs do not divulge are the eventual scope and magnitude of the change.
Yet the same was true of the two earlier occasions in which American foreign policy underwent significant transformation. The observer in 1947 could not know from the events of that year the form that the emerging policy of containment would ultimately take. In its inception containment had no determinate outcome. Neither the external circumstances in which containment arose and which conditioned the immediate development of that policy nor the domestic reaction to these circumstances dictated the form that containment would ultimately take. It is true that in the sweeping language of the Truman Doctrine-"We must assist free peoples to work out their destinies in their own way"-as well as in its sense of universal crisis-"At the present moment in world history every nation must choose between alternative ways of life"-we can see the subsequent course of a policy that led to the equation of American security with world order, world order with the containment of communism, and the containment of communism with the conflict-Vietnam-that brought an end to the policy of global containment.
But the Truman Doctrine did not foreordain Vietnam, whatever the intent of its authors. Instead, it was the Korean War, and the sudden extension of containment to Asia that the war precipitated, which led to Vietnam. It was the American intervention in Korea-prompted far more by conventional balance-of-power calculations than by the universal pretensions of the Truman Doctrine-that led to the extension of containment in Asia, which was divisive from the start and never supported by more than a negative consensus.
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Americans with no sense of history take their self-image from myth, including that of the 'good war'. At the core of the US myth one finds "an essentially religious value system" and "the symbolism of a New World" giving rise in both US parties to 'progressives' who wish to reform a corrupted world and 'purifiers' who wish to keep the USA unsullied by it. The myth rejects the rituals and cynicism of 'grand strategy' and looks instead to the 'just war' with its moral aims. Yet reality has failed the myth -- in the post-1945 nuclear stalemate and in limited wars such as Vietnam. From this has come Reagan's 'de facto' policy of limitation. However dangerous some of its Third World 'margins' may be, the world no longer threatens US values.
Our society was one of the first to write a Constitution. This reflected the confident conviction of the Enlightenment that explicit written arrangements could be devised to structure a government that would be neither tyrannical nor impotent in its time, and to allow for future amendment as experience and change might require.
This year was in all respects a very heavy time," wrote the authors of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle in 1097, and we can appropriately use the same phrase to describe 1980. To be sure our country was not engaged in war; the Danes did not raid our coast; America was still rich by world standards; and the harvest was adequate. But a doleful chorus of lamentation was heard not only in our land but throughout the non-communist nations. It had a persistent recurring theme. At a time when the Soviet Union was systematically extending its military reach, the United States was falling into apathy and incompetence. No longer did we Americans seem willing and able to assure the security of our friends and allies. No longer did we display the mastery of events that had given confidence in our economic, political and military leadership.
