Something strange is occurring in the U.S.-South African relationship. At a time when our two societies need each other more than before, it is becoming unclear which one is more effective in exploiting divisions in the other. After nearly 20 years in which successive Republican and Democratic administrations have established some modest guidelines for U.S. policy, it has become fashionable to question whether the United States even has a policy toward South Africa. The fragile centrist consensus that so urgently needs to be strengthened among Americans instead founders in a fog of stereotypes and polarized perceptions about the country. On their side, South Africans are so enmeshed in their own internal ferment and so disenchanted with the recent American performance (globally as well as in southern Africa) that they view the United States increasingly as an object for manipulation, an ineffectual and reactive power.
Chester A. Crocker is Director of African Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University and Associate Professor of International Relations at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. Among his recent publications is South Africa into the 1980s, coedited with Richard E. Bissell.
Something strange is occurring in the U.S.-South African relationship. At a time when our two societies need each other more than before, it is becoming unclear which one is more effective in exploiting divisions in the other. After nearly 20 years in which successive Republican and Democratic administrations have established some modest guidelines for U.S. policy, it has become fashionable to question whether the United States even has a policy toward South Africa. The fragile centrist consensus that so urgently needs to be strengthened among Americans instead founders in a fog of stereotypes and polarized perceptions about the country. On their side, South Africans are so enmeshed in their own internal ferment and so disenchanted with the recent American performance (globally as well as in southern Africa) that they view the United States increasingly as an object for manipulation, an ineffectual and reactive power.
With Zimbabwe's independence and Namibia's uncertain but inexorable movement in the same direction, Americans have to come to some minimal level of agreement about the question of South Africa. The problem is that the land of apartheid operates as a magnet for one-dimensional minds. How do we overcome the disturbing tendency to treat this troubled land as a political fire sale to be ransacked for confirmation of previously held convictions?
The beginning of wisdom is to recognize that Americans need to do their homework and become less gullible in responding to the dissonant babble of voices from South Africa. A working familiarity with the country's major actors and institutions would help. South Africa is a vast and varied country, and one rarely meets the residents of Cradock or Koopmansfontein. Instead, one meets the urbane business elite, embittered black exiles, white refugees forecasting Armageddon, or slick hucksters of the status quo peddling a message of krugerrands, the Cape route and chrome reserves. More attention must be focused on those South Africans-the Afrikaners and the African majority-who are shaping and challenging the current order.
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South Africa's negotiating parties continue to stave off violent extremists on both the right and left. More than a tussle over constitutional mechanics, the current negotiations are an effort to construct a political center that will hold. But agreeing on a spring election well before establishing the rules of the game has transformed the talks into a power struggle, and the eight-month election campaign into a gauntlet of uncertainty.
The dominant element in American foreign policy since 1946 has been opposition to communism and to the communist powers. As far as Africa was concerned, responsibility for pursuing these objectives was delegated to America's trusted allies - Britain, France, Belgium, and even Portugal - whose policies in the area were therefore broadly supported despite minor disagreements which arose as American business became interested in Africa's potential. Inevitably this placed America in opposition to an Africa which was trying to win its independence from those same powers; but when political freedom could be achieved peacefully, America was able to appear to Africa like a bystander. It was therefore able to adjust its policies and accept the new status quo of African sovereign states without any difficulty. Notwithstanding these adjustments, however, America has continued to look at African affairs largely through anti-communist spectacles and to disregard Africa's different concerns and priorities.
The Reagan Administration, though surefooted domestically, is now absorbing the awkward truth about international relations which continues to surprise many youthful governments--that criticizing foreign policy is easier than making it, that making it is easier than carrying it out, and that political honeymoons are of short and not always blissful duration. Nowhere has this syndrome been more pronounced than in the Administration's attempt to construct a new relationship with South Africa.

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