Japanese Security Policies and the United States

Americans who follow trends in Japanese security policies tend to divide into those who see little significant change, particularly in terms of the central importance of the U.S. alliance, and those who believe that Japan is poised to embark on a more assertive and independent course involving independent military capabilities and an important role in regional security. Which view is more nearly correct, and how the balance is struck between autonomy and alliance, are crucially important questions, both in themselves and in terms of U.S.-Japan relations.

There can be little doubt that Japanese thinking has entered a new phase, over the last decade but especially in the past few years, and that the central factor underlying Japanese concern with what has come to be called "comprehensive security" is a marked shift in Japanese perceptions and attitudes concerning the United States. In an important and illuminating report for then Prime Minister Ohira, a group of specialists headed by Masamichi Inoki noted this shift in July 1980 in no uncertain terms: "the most fundamental change in the international situation which emerged in the 1970s was the end of American superiority both militarily and economically."1 No longer could the United States be depended upon to underwrite a stable international currency system, to guarantee Japanese access to energy and raw materials, or to secure Japanese political interests in a stable political order.

Such a view, which sometimes takes the form of an exaggerated perception of American weakness and decline, has been reflected to some extent in Japanese policy-in its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in its Arab tilt after the 1973 oil boycott, in the new interest in military defense, and in the willingness of some of its leaders to express their views more forthrightly than in the past on a variety of international issues.