Reassessing Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
The possibility that additional nations, or even terrorists, might get nuclear weapons has been a cause of deep anxiety ever since the first atomic weapon was exploded in 1945. It has been the subject of one important treaty (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT) and more recently preventing proliferation was one of the central objectives of the Carter Administration, in an effort that generated intense controversy. Today an assessment of that effort is important because nuclear proliferation continues to be a most dangerous prospect in the coming decades_deserving of as much attention as the Soviet Union and the national security risks arising from dependence on foreign oil, as well as the basic economic problems of high inflation and low productivity.
Gerard C. Smith was Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) from 1969 to 1972, and has recently published Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I. From 1977 to 1980 he was Ambassador at Large and Special Presidential Representative for nonproliferation matters. George W. Rathjens is a Professor of Political Science at MIT; he served as Ambassador Smith's deputy in 1979-80.
The possibility that additional nations, or even terrorists, might get nuclear weapons has been a cause of deep anxiety ever since the first atomic weapon was exploded in 1945. It has been the subject of one important treaty (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT) and more recently preventing proliferation was one of the central objectives of the Carter Administration, in an effort that generated intense controversy. Today an assessment of that effort is important because nuclear proliferation continues to be a most dangerous prospect in the coming decades-deserving of as much attention as the Soviet Union and the national security risks arising from dependence on foreign oil, as well as the basic economic problems of high inflation and low productivity.
The Reagan Administration clearly faces a legacy of unresolved proliferation problems. In several non-weapons states construction continues on facilities useful for producing weapons-grade material. And serious differences persist among the major exporting countries over conditions for international commerce in nuclear materials and technology.
One of the basic elements of the controversy has concerned the linkage between weapons potentials and the spread of nuclear power facilities. This was the cornerstone of the Carter Administration's approach. It is unquestionably of central importance in assessing the dangers of access by terrorist or other subnational groups to weapons-grade materials. But in the case of weapons acquisition by nations, which has been the main concern of U.S. policy (and is our principal concern here), the significance of nuclear power facilities is more debatable and may even be of secondary importance, since nations can build plants specifically for weapons programs, as all the present weapons states have done.
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
While the past decade of Sino-American relations has been largely constructive, the ten years have not been on a steady incline. Rather, there have been two strong forward spurts, from spring 1971 through May 1973, and from May 1978 through early 1980. The relationship has also endured two periods of some acrimony and erosion: from the fall of 1975 to late 1976 and from mid-1980 to the effort to stabilize the relationship reflected in the communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan that was agreed in August 1982. In addition to the periods of rapid forward movement and retrogression, several periods are best portrayed through metaphors such as "plateaus" or "mixed pictures." Even the best periods were punctuated by moments of doubt and uncertainty, while the phases of deterioration were constrained by a common desire to limit the erosion and to preserve a more positive public facade than the private exchanges warranted.
Since World War II there has been a continuing debate on military doctrine concerning the actual utility of nuclear weapons in war. This debate, irrespective of the merits of the divergent points of view, tends to create the perception that the outcome and scale of a nuclear conflict could be controlled by the doctrine or the types of nuclear weapons employed. Is this the case?
The recent heated debate over the sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes and F-15 fighter components to Saudi Arabia was only one of a number of controversies involving U.S. arms sales. The next weapons transfer which will meet congressional resistance is that of F-16 fighters to Pakistan, a sale which some believe will give a renewed impetus to the arms race on the subcontinent and undermine nonproliferation efforts. Serious questions are also being raised about the wisdom of the planned sale of F-16s to Venezuela, thereby crossing a technological threshold which in the past has restrained the transfer of the most advanced fighter aircraft to Latin America. Proposed new arms supply relationships with Argentina, Chile and Guatemala will draw the ire of those who are concerned about the dropping of past restrictions based upon these countries' human rights records. The Reagan Administration is faced with a tough decision regarding the sale of the FX fighter to Taiwan. Beijing has put Washington on notice that it considers the proposed sale as a "litmus test" of future Sino-American relations. But the same type of symbolism is attached to the sale by Taipei, which would view the failure to sell as a sign of abandonment.
