Reassessing Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

The possibility that additional nations, or even terrorists, might get nuclear weapons has been a cause of deep anxiety ever since the first atomic weapon was exploded in 1945. It has been the subject of one important treaty (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT) and more recently preventing proliferation was one of the central objectives of the Carter Administration, in an effort that generated intense controversy. Today an assessment of that effort is important because nuclear proliferation continues to be a most dangerous prospect in the coming decades-deserving of as much attention as the Soviet Union and the national security risks arising from dependence on foreign oil, as well as the basic economic problems of high inflation and low productivity.

The Reagan Administration clearly faces a legacy of unresolved proliferation problems. In several non-weapons states construction continues on facilities useful for producing weapons-grade material. And serious differences persist among the major exporting countries over conditions for international commerce in nuclear materials and technology.

One of the basic elements of the controversy has concerned the linkage between weapons potentials and the spread of nuclear power facilities. This was the cornerstone of the Carter Administration's approach. It is unquestionably of central importance in assessing the dangers of access by terrorist or other subnational groups to weapons-grade materials. But in the case of weapons acquisition by nations, which has been the main concern of U.S. policy (and is our principal concern here), the significance of nuclear power facilities is more debatable and may even be of secondary importance, since nations can build plants specifically for weapons programs, as all the present weapons states have done.