Speaking of America: Public Diplomacy in our Time
Despite virtual invisibility outside the diplomatic community and antipathy on the part of many within, public diplomacy--the dissemination of America's message abroad--may become Washington's major growth industry over the coming four years. A neat congruence of personality, technology and history makes this a reasonable prospect.
Kenneth L. Adelman is with the Strategic Studies Center of SRI International (formerly the Stanford Research Institute). He served as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense in 1976-77, and was a member of the Reagan Administration's foreign affairs transition team. He is the author of African Realities.
Despite virtual invisibility outside the diplomatic community and antipathy on the part of many within, public diplomacy-the dissemination of America's message abroad-may become Washington's major growth industry over the coming four years. A neat congruence of personality, technology and history makes this a reasonable prospect.
The personality is that of Ronald Reagan, a gifted professional communicator who has spent much of his adult life in radio, on the lecture circuit, in syndicated column-writing, or along the campaign trail. Public diplomacy is the component of international affairs he knows best and does best. It has the makings of becoming a hallmark of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy.
The technology is the evolving global communications network which has made public diplomacy a more powerful instrument. And the historical component is the rise after the twin Iranian-Afghan crises of a fiery pro-Americanism which may burn as the political flame of the coming years. The American mood is one of pride, not shame. The national desire is to exalt America's virtues, not to veil them. Gone is the self-deprecating temper of the 1960s and 1970s, when many Americans, particularly in the intellectual establishment, shrunk from advocacy of what they deemed a flawed, even sick society.
Today's temper may appear a little chauvinistic, even jingoistic, but it is not more so than that felt by the Founding Fathers. Even before our independence, John Adams wrote in 1765 that the settlement of America constituted "the opening of a grand design in Providence for illumination of the ignorant, and the emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth." Before our political system was established, Alexander Hamilton wrote in 1784 that America's liberty "has occasioned a kind of revolution in human sentiment. The influence of our example has penetrated the gloomy regions of despotism." The idea of America as primarily an idea is hence an old one. And it is still a captivating one. More than a million people around the world have applied for immigration visas to come to these shores. Some will have to wait 11 years or more for permission to enter, if it is granted and if they can leave their countries at all.
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