Don't Engulf the Gulf

Five months after Ronald Reagan's inauguration, his Administration's approach to the vital Persian Gulf region is clear-but the logic behind its policies remains obscure. More disturbing, the policies themselves are contradictory and self-defeating; unless modified, they won't work.

Eager to demonstrate American resolve and assertiveness, the new Administration has embarked on a geostrategic East-West military strategy that compounds the errors of the Carter/Brzezinski White House and revives memories of some of John Foster Dulles' more ill-conceived ventures. By concentrating single-mindedly on the Soviet threat to the Gulf, the Administration thus far has failed to shape the type of comprehensive strategy needed to meet the most likely dangers to Western interests-and it has badly misjudged regional realities.

The Reagan approach is based on several assumptions:

- the Soviet Union is the primary threat to a region which supplies about 35 percent of the oil consumed in the free world economy;

- in order to concentrate on thwarting Moscow's expansionism, Washington should deemphasize efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute;

- Soviet power can best be contained militarily by putting more money and muscle into the Rapid Deployment Force and encouraging a European contribution, even if indirect, to the RDF;

- a "consensus of strategic concerns" should be developed among the countries stretching from Pakistan westward through Saudi Arabia to Egypt and Turkey, and including Israel;

- if a "strategic entity" can be created among these countries, some of the regional states may be persuaded to accept U.S. ground forces-a necessary requirement if the Soviet threat is to be effectively curbed...

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