Five months after Ronald Reagan_s inauguration, his Administration_s approach to the vital Persian Gulf region is clear_but the logic behind its policies remains obscure. More disturbing, the policies themselves are contradictory and self-defeating; unless modified, they won_t work.
Christopher van Hollen is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1969 to 1972 and Ambassador to Sri Lanka from 1972 to 1976.
Five months after Ronald Reagan's inauguration, his Administration's approach to the vital Persian Gulf region is clear-but the logic behind its policies remains obscure. More disturbing, the policies themselves are contradictory and self-defeating; unless modified, they won't work.
Eager to demonstrate American resolve and assertiveness, the new Administration has embarked on a geostrategic East-West military strategy that compounds the errors of the Carter/Brzezinski White House and revives memories of some of John Foster Dulles' more ill-conceived ventures. By concentrating single-mindedly on the Soviet threat to the Gulf, the Administration thus far has failed to shape the type of comprehensive strategy needed to meet the most likely dangers to Western interests-and it has badly misjudged regional realities.
The Reagan approach is based on several assumptions:
- the Soviet Union is the primary threat to a region which supplies about 35 percent of the oil consumed in the free world economy;
- in order to concentrate on thwarting Moscow's expansionism, Washington should deemphasize efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute;
- Soviet power can best be contained militarily by putting more money and muscle into the Rapid Deployment Force and encouraging a European contribution, even if indirect, to the RDF;
- a "consensus of strategic concerns" should be developed among the countries stretching from Pakistan westward through Saudi Arabia to Egypt and Turkey, and including Israel;
- if a "strategic entity" can be created among these countries, some of the regional states may be persuaded to accept U.S. ground forces-a necessary requirement if the Soviet threat is to be effectively curbed...
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The basic assumptions of U.S. policy toward the Gulf demand rethinking. The Pentagon pays up to $60 billion a year to protect the import of $30 billion worth of oil that would flow anyway. Playing the role of regional hegemon ties America to troubled regimes and leaves it out on a limb, while allies sit back. Washington must hedge against inevitable political change in the region by spreading the burden and the say, reversing arms proliferation, and encouraging the Gulf states to come up with some security of their own.
Relations between Canada and the United States have become more strained than at any time in recent memory. There have been many earlier periods of tension, but the policy orientations of the two capitals in late 1981 appear to be far more divergent than in the past. The two governments seem to be on a collision course, in a context that political leaders cannot fully control.
The United States recently "discovered" Mexico. Potential oil reserves of 200 billion barrels helped focus our attention and sparked interest in forging some kind of special relationship with our southern neighbor. Concrete proposals range from a North American Accord or Common Market to less dramatic package deals that would swap petroleum for increased Mexican access to U.S. markets.

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