South Africa: Is Change Coming?

The Reagan Administration, though surefooted domestically, is now absorbing the awkward truth about international relations which continues to surprise many youthful governments-that criticizing foreign policy is easier than making it, that making it is easier than carrying it out, and that political honeymoons are of short and not always blissful duration. Nowhere has this syndrome been more pronounced than in the Administration's attempt to construct a new relationship with South Africa.

The policy is still in its infancy. But a series of missteps has introduced confusion and alarm where the intention was precisely the opposite. There have been off-the-cuff presidential statements suggesting that a much warmer relationship with a "friendly" South Africa, unqualified by any quid pro quo, is in the offing; embarrassing visits by senior South African military intelligence officials; interminable delays over the appointment of the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for Africa; much official shuttling between Pretoria and Washington with little apparent reward and less explanation; alarm signals ringing in African capitals and not always adroit attempts to silence them; and some tantalizing leaks compounding the confusion.

It is understandable that a new government wants to make a new start. Reagan's advisers on Africa felt that the Carter Administration's policy in the troubled southern part of the continent was simply not working. So, equally understandably, they devised a plan which they thought would protect all the United States' interests in that region but would lay particular emphasis on the Administration's determination to counter Soviet influence, the symphonic theme of President Reagan's foreign policy. The tactical thrust of the new approach would be the creation of a closer and more harmonious relationship with South Africa, without jeopardizing the United States' important interests in the rest of Africa. The plan, like many good blueprints, was thoughtful, sophisticated and eminently rational.1 Unfortunately, the target areas-South Africa but also its African opponents-have so far shown little inclination to take their appointed places in this tidy construct.

The basic premise of the Reagan Administration's new "tilt" toward South Africa, characterized as "constructive engagement," is that P.W. Botha's government represents a unique opportunity for change in the Republic.