Nuclear Weapons in the 1980s: The Implications of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe
Since nuclear deterrence began, some of the forces providing deterrence for the West have been stationed in Europe. In the early period, when delivery systems did not yet enjoy intercontinental range, European real estate was essential for America's strategic deterrent. But with new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-based nuclear missiles, introduced in the late 1950s, the U.S. nuclear deterrent no longer required bases in Europe: the age of geographic deterrence identity between the United States and its European allies had come to an end.
Christoph Bertram is Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. This article is adapted from a longer chapter prepared initially for the Aspen Consortium on Arms Control and International Security. The chapter will be included in the Consortium's report, Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture, edited by Barry M. Blechman, to be published by Ballinger in the spring of 1982.
Since nuclear deterrence began, some of the forces providing deterrence for the West have been stationed in Europe. In the early period, when delivery systems did not yet enjoy intercontinental range, European real estate was essential for America's strategic deterrent. But with new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-based nuclear missiles, introduced in the late 1950s, the U.S. nuclear deterrent no longer required bases in Europe: the age of geographic deterrence identity between the United States and its European allies had come to an end.
The military and political problems of the European theater nuclear balance have arisen since then. They are essentially caused by the distinctiveness of the theater issues from the nuclear-strategic aspects; the main focus of debate regarding the balance has, in fact, been on the degree of this distinctiveness and the consequences that follow from it. This pattern runs from the transatlantic debate over the Multilateral Force (MLF) in the early 1960s to that over the function of tactical nuclear weapons in European defense; from the political concerns over the withdrawal of the U.S. Jupiter and Thor missiles in the early 1960s to the first real Alliance decision on theater nuclear forces, taken in December 1979, to station new U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles on European territory. However painful that decision was for a number of European governments, and however controversial it has become in their internal political debates, it is not the first nor will it be the last time that theater nuclear issues have strained the Alliance.
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