Mitterrand's Foreign Policy: The Limits of Continuity

Under Charles de Gaulle, French foreign policy as seen from Washington had a "nuisance value" at a time when France's domestic choices were much more in tune with those of her allies and neighbors. Under François Mitterrand, the radical nature of the domestic changes in France (e.g., nationalization of major industries and banks, decentralization of the administration of the country) have virtually changed French foreign policy into a reassuring value. At a time when pacifism is sweeping Northern Europe, and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, France, with her firmness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, her nuclear striking force, her strong defense budget and weak pacifist movement, seems an oasis of continuity.

Is this optimism justified? Is "changing France still steadfast?" Can France reconcile the cost of her domestic policies to the ambitions of her foreign policy, or will the radical nature of her internal changes ultimately affect the very essence of foreign policy?

II

If we can speak of continuity in Mitterrand's foreign policy, it is a continuity that has more in common with de Gaulle's policies than with Georges Pompidou's or Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's. For Pompidou, France was to become a major industrial power. For Giscard d'Estaing, she was to hold her place among the advanced countries in the world. Rejecting these legitimate but highly unromantic ambitions, Mitterrand shares de Gaulle's faith in France's special mission in the world. He even transcends it by fusing France's destiny with that of socialism. In his inaugural speech at the Elysée Palace, Mitterrand set the tone for his foreign policy by stressing that a great nation should entertain only noble projects and that France should "enlighten humanity's progress."