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The Conduct of American Foreign Policy: Ideology in Search of a Policy

By Raymond Aron
America and the World 1981
Summary: 

Three signal events marked the year 1981 (at least, from the point of view of a Frenchman): the arrival of Ronald Reagan at the White House in January; the election of François Mitterrand to the presidency of the French Republic followed by the election of an absolute majority of the Socialists to the National Assembly in the spring; and, of course, the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in October. At the same time, no crises were settled during the past year (not even the Polish one), no wars begun, and none ended. The official calendar did not coincide with a historic period in any part of the world.

Raymond Aron, the French political philosopher, is a Member of the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques. He is the author of The Century of Total War, The Opium of Intellectuals, Peace and War Among Nations, among many other works.

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