One should approach the subject of Africa with caution. Like a horse, it is dangerous at both ends and uncomfortable in the middle. 1981 has been dominated by continuing conflicts in southern Africa and in the Western Sahara, Chad and Eritrea. In northeastern Africa, past and present conflict has swollen the flood of African refugees to almost half the total number of refugees in the world, at a time when a gravely worsening economic crisis, exacerbated by unusual climatic conditions stretching over a period of years, has brought to millions in sub-Saharan Africa the prospect of death by starvation. The assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat in October was a dramatic reminder that Africa's troubles cannot be insulated from the rest of the world, that external dependence which ignores internal political and economic realities is dangerous--that there are limits to America's ability to control events in Africa.
David Anderson is Assistant Secretary-General in the Commonwealth Secretariat in London, and Managing Director of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation. He has worked and travelled widely in Africa for over 30 years. The views expressed in this article are entirely personal.
One should approach the subject of Africa with caution. Like a horse, it is dangerous at both ends and uncomfortable in the middle. 1981 has been dominated by continuing conflicts in southern Africa and in the Western Sahara, Chad and Eritrea. In northeastern Africa, past and present conflict has swollen the flood of African refugees to almost half the total number of refugees in the world, at a time when a gravely worsening economic crisis, exacerbated by unusual climatic conditions stretching over a period of years, has brought to millions in sub-Saharan Africa the prospect of death by starvation. The assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat in October was a dramatic reminder that Africa's troubles cannot be insulated from the rest of the world, that external dependence which ignores internal political and economic realities is dangerous-that there are limits to America's ability to control events in Africa.
It was a depressing scene for the new American Administration as it began to fit Africa into its global policies, but as the year progressed some shafts of light were breaking through. In African eyes by far the most crucial issue was, and remains, the independence of Namibia. After a faltering start American diplomacy was instrumental in putting the negotiations to this end back on track, so that by the end of the year international agreement on arrangements to bring Namibia to independence as a unitary state seemed once more to be in prospect. The outcome, however, remains dependent on decisions by a South African government that has swung during the year to a more hard-line posture both on internal affairs and in its actions toward its neighbors.
Elsewhere in southern Africa, Angola remains torn by civil war, and its future depends heavily on a successful outcome of the Namibia negotiations. The new government of Zimbabwe, however, continued to win respect-and some financial assistance-from the international community for the skill and compassion with which it tackled its delicate internal adjustments and the mature responsibility with which it recognized the sensitivity of the southern African situation, despite recurrent provocations from neighboring South Africa.
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President Reagan's sweep of 49 of the 50 states in the November 1984 elections set in motion mutations within both the Republican and Democratic Parties that have substantially affected U.S. relations with Africa. The mushrooming of groups and individuals in the coalition known as the Free South Africa Movement is ascribed by its founder, TransAfrica's Randall Robinson, to a post-election assessment that a very daring gamble was the only hope of keeping anti-apartheid activism alive in the face of another four years of "constructive engagement." On another front, the congressional leaders of the shattered Democratic Party seized upon apartheid as the most promising issue for drawing Jesse Jackson's constituency and other blacks sidelined during the campaign back into the party's mainstream. The 35 Republican congressmen who dispatched a sharply worded letter of protest against Pretoria's racial policies to South African Ambassador B. G. Fourie in December 1984 were at least partially motivated by a new belief that it was historically and practically shortsighted for the Republicans to concede the black vote and the civil rights constituency as a given to the Democratic Party.
Charts the development of US foreign policy efforts under Reagan in (1) the Angolan conflict (2) South Africa. Since 1981, the US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester A Crocker, has pursued two main objectives in Africa (1) the reduction of Soviet/Cuban influence and cross-border conflict (2) the introduction of more liberal policies in South Africa.
The end of the Cold War and of apartheid have "undermined the logic that once drove America's alliances of expediency on the continent, which were so inimical to expanding civil liberties in Africa". The West should develop a selective foreign policy, favouring states showing pro-market and pro-democracy traits, and showing "equal-opportunity hostility" to remaining despots.

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