Economies are like bicycles. The faster they move, the better they maintain their balance unaided. An economy experiencing rapid growth can adjust with relative ease to changes in supply, demand and technology. Workers whose jobs are threatened because of new products, shifts in consumer tastes, or automation can find new jobs; communities whose major industries are failing can attract new industry; and firms whose products are becoming less competitive can diversify into more competitive lines of business. All these adjustments, in turn, help ensure continued growth.
Robert B. Reich teaches business and public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He was Director of Policy Planning for the Federal Trade Commission from 1977 to 1981 and is coauthor with Ira Magaziner of the recently published book, Minding America's Business. The present article was originally presented at the Conference on Industrial Policy, sponsored by the Democracy Project, in Washington, D.C., on January 14, 1982; research was supported by a grant from the Columbia University Center for Law and Economic Studies. The author wishes to thank William Diebold, Jr. for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
Economies are like bicycles. The faster they move, the better they maintain their balance unaided. An economy experiencing rapid growth can adjust with relative ease to changes in supply, demand and technology. Workers whose jobs are threatened because of new products, shifts in consumer tastes, or automation can find new jobs; communities whose major industries are failing can attract new industry; and firms whose products are becoming less competitive can diversify into more competitive lines of business. All these adjustments, in turn, help ensure continued growth.
Adjustment is less automatic, however, in an economy growing slowly. Under these circumstances, workers, communities, and firms facing economic changes that erode their competitive position often have no profitable alternative toward which to shift their resources. Because the process of economic change may seriously threaten their future well-being, they turn to political devices designed to stem the tide, at least temporarily: legislation to stop runaway plants, regulations to prohibit the introduction of new technologies, government-financed bailouts. But protections like these retard future economic growth by encumbering the movement of resources toward more productive uses, and the downward cycle perpetuates itself.
Foreign trade intensifies both alternatives. It can make a growing economy even more dynamic-providing domestic firms with a wider range of resources and technologies with which to produce, and a larger market in which to trade, than they could enjoy in a single national economy. The international arena thereby offers opportunities to reduce unit costs far more rapidly than they could be reduced in a single economy, and thus contributes to faster economic growth.
On the other hand, foreign trade can exacerbate the problems of adjustment within a slow economy. Under these circumstances, more rapid growth often takes place in a different nation, to which domestic capital is attracted. Domestic labor is left behind within vast regional pockets of unemployment from which escape is costly and psychologically difficult, while domestic industries that have high fixed costs gradually lose their market share to their foreign rivals.
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The American labor movement has basically concentrated on domestic issues--with the notable exception of its vigorous efforts to further the cause of human rights, free trade unionism and political democracy throughout the world. This focus on the United States has been the result of both the sheer size of the American economy and work force and the specific circumstances which gave rise to the rapid growth of the labor movement in the 1930s.
The United States is now engaged in a divisive debate over international trade. On one side are disciples of the principle of free trade--the touchstone of American trade policy in the postwar era. Free traders argue that the interests of the United States, and of the world, continue to lie in reducing barriers, subsidies and other government interventions which distort the natural pattern of specialization and trade among countries. On the other side are those calling for policies to protect American industry from foreign competition. Protectionists argue that imports are causing massive unemployment and eroding the nation's industrial base.
The view that nations compete against each other like big corporations has become pervasive among Western elites, many of whom are in the Clinton administration. As a practical matter, however, the doctrine of "competitiveness" is flatly wrong. The world's leading nations are not, to any important degree, in economic competition with each other. Nor can their major economic woes be attributed to "losing" on world markets. This is particularly true in the case of the United States. Yet Clinton's theorists of competitiveness, from Laura D. Andrea Tyson to Robert Reich to Ira Magaziner, make seemingly sophisticated arguments, most of which are supported by careless arithmetic and sloppy research. Competitiveness is a seductive idea, promising easy answers to complex problems. But the result of this obsession is misallocated resources, trade frictions and bad domestic economic policies.
