The United States and Brazil: The Case of the Missing Relationship
Brazil is not much in the news these days. Of course, no news is good news to a Reagan Administration beleaguered by internal dissension in the formulation of foreign policy and problems elsewhere in the world that are less tractable than campaign slogans suggested. It seems to confirm the prevailing view in Washington that the U.S.-Brazil relationship is back on course again after the trying Carter years when human-rights concerns and resistance to nuclear proliferation seemed to cause it to go awry.
Albert Fishlow is Professor of Economics and Director of the Concilium on International and Area Studies, Yale University. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in 1975-76, and was a member of the Linowitz Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations as well as the recent U.S.-Brazil Commission.
Brazil is not much in the news these days. Of course, no news is good news to a Reagan Administration beleaguered by internal dissension in the formulation of foreign policy and problems elsewhere in the world that are less tractable than campaign slogans suggested. It seems to confirm the prevailing view in Washington that the U.S.-Brazil relationship is back on course again after the trying Carter years when human-rights concerns and resistance to nuclear proliferation seemed to cause it to go awry.
But, on second thought, Brazil's disappearance from the news may be part of what is wrong with present strategy. Brazil, after all, is the principal military power in South America and sits astride the sea lanes of the South Atlantic that carry petroleum from the Persian Gulf and strategic minerals from Africa. Its technological sophistication has made possible increasing exports of arms-expected to have amounted to more than one billion dollars in 1981. It is the eighth largest market economy in the world and tenth overall, with a gross product of around $220 billion. Brazil has rapidly increased its integration into international markets in the last decade: since 1973 its exports have quadrupled and its debt increased by a factor of about five. Equally to the point, Brazil is undergoing far-reaching internal changes. The economic miracle and authoritarian stability are no more.
Brazil has experienced its worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, with a negative growth rate of almost four percent last year, and a larger decline in industrial production. The recession has been imposed deliberately with the primary objective of shoring up a vulnerable balance of payments that remained in deficit in 1981 on current account by some ten billion dollars, despite about a doubling of exports between 1978 and 1981. Since 1973, despite world recession and ever-larger oil imports, Brazil had managed through reliance on external finance to sustain a growth rate of almost seven percent. Now its economic prospects, at least in the near term, are distinctly more clouded...
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
The United States is spreading its aid and efforts too thin in the developing world. It should focus on a small number of "pivotal states": countries whose fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system. The list should include Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. A discriminating strategy for shoring up the developing world is a wise way to address traditional security threats and new transnational issues; it might be thought of as the new, improved domino theory. If effective, it could forestall the move in Congress to wipe out nearly all foreign aid.
Soon it will be a year since Jimmy Carter's April 1978 trip to Brazil. Prior to the visit strained relations between the two countries were ill concealed. Washington's efforts to roll back the Brazilian-West German agreement for construction of facilities for uranium reprocessing and enrichment in Brazil were deeply resented - not least because Vice President Mondale was dispatched first to Bonn.
The USA maintains that its aim is for a peaceful settlement in Nicaragua in a regional context that advances the prospects for democracy, protects the interests of the Contras and preserves US strategic interests. These goals involve a potentially long and difficult process. The accord concluded by the Central American Presidents in Aug 1987 by no means ensures peace. The practical question facing the USA is how to preserve its commitment to the Contras while still influencing the negotiating process.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.