Military and Political Policy: The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade
Since the end of World War II, Europe and North America have enjoyed an unprecedented era of peace. The central framework for maintaining that peace has been the North Atlantic Alliance and its permanent organization, NATO. Created to secure the West against aggression through a mutual defense system, NATO has proved remarkably successful in meeting a variety of challenges over the years. It has done so because Western leaders and the overwhelming majority of their countrymen have recognized the virtues of collective security for nations whose fundamental interests are held so closely in common.
General Bernard W. Rogers has been Supreme Allied Commander Europe since June 1979, stationed in Belgium. Before assuming this international position, he was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1976 to 1979. Portions of this article are adapted from an address by General Rogers on February 26, 1982, to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. A German translation of this article is being published simultaneously by Europa-Archiv, in Bonn.
Since the end of World War II, Europe and North America have enjoyed an unprecedented era of peace. The central framework for maintaining that peace has been the North Atlantic Alliance and its permanent organization, NATO. Created to secure the West against aggression through a mutual defense system, NATO has proved remarkably successful in meeting a variety of challenges over the years. It has done so because Western leaders and the overwhelming majority of their countrymen have recognized the virtues of collective security for nations whose fundamental interests are held so closely in common.
The Alliance today faces a more complex set of challenges than perhaps at any time in its history. Paramount among them is the unrelenting growth of Soviet military power which is coupled to, if not the major inspiration for, the current expansionism in Soviet foreign policy. The global nature of Soviet military power adds a new dimension to traditional concerns, for it poses a menace to the vital worldwide interests of a regionally bounded Alliance. Over the years the Alliance has formulated responses to the threats which face it. Programs for security improvements grow within the integrated military structure. Political commitments to these programs are renewed at NATO ministerial meetings. Yet, to an uncomfortable degree, these programs have fallen short of fulfillment.
The reasons for nations' reluctance to carry out agreed defense commitments go beyond the current economic slowdown in the West, although that is the proximate cause. In the debates over security policy throughout the Alliance there is evidence of deeper public concerns over basic Alliance purposes and over the viability of Alliance efforts to achieve them. Thus, in this fourth decade of NATO, it would seem appropriate to reaffirm what it is we seek to achieve and to elaborate clearly for our publics how we propose to get there.
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In the light of the anticipated INF agreement the question is whether confrontation is entering a genuine phase of de-escalation or merely a tactical one. Most NATO commanders agree that a surprise attack by conventional Soviet forces is improbable. NATO should develop a plan for exploiting the potential for reductions in conventional weapons and make a serious effort to achieve an agreement. There may be room for trade-offs in economic credits and managerial skills for large-scale Soviet force reductions.
Defends the traditional, pessimistic evaluation of NATO's conventional capabilities against revisionists, and argues that "NATO is highly unlikely to make the conventional force improvements seemingly dictated by the INF treaty". Predicts a Soviet arms control offensive upon "a vulnerable and divided NATO... the alliance has painted itself into a corner, and the paint will not dry". Despite all this, NATO will continue to prevent war in Europe.
The NATO war in Kosovo did not come out of the blue. The alliance fought only after Belgrade turned a deaf ear to diplomacy, and NATO knew the risks it was running. But doing nothing would have been worse; assenting to Slobodan Milosevic's mass killings would have dangerously undermined the credibility of Western institutions.

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