Toward an Overall Western Strategy for Peace, Freedom and Progress
"The unity of the Alliance is the basis of any successful relationship with the East." The converse of this remark by President Reagan also holds true: agreement in the Alliance on policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as agreement on political, economic and military strategy: this is the basis of the Alliance's cohesion and its ability to act.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher has been Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, and leader of the Free Democratic Party, since 1974.
"The unity of the Alliance is the basis of any successful relationship with the East." The converse of this remark by President Reagan also holds true: agreement in the Alliance on policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as agreement on political, economic and military strategy-this is the basis of the Alliance's cohesion and its ability to act.
In the Summer issue of this periodical the German view was presented on the subject of military strategy.1 I shall therefore confine my observations to questions of political and economic strategy.
Ever since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and especially since the imposition of martial law in Poland as a result of Soviet pressure, these questions have been at the forefront of the discussion between Europe and America. In this debate we have managed to transform crises of the Eastern bloc into crises-or rather moods of crisis-in the Western Alliance.
What the outside observer sees is truly paradoxical:
- In Poland the fragility of Soviet rule over Eastern Europe is once more being demonstrated-and more clearly than ever. A communist party, deprived of its ideological strength and no longer able to rule on its own, cedes power to the military.
- The crisis not only of the Polish but of the entire communist economic system manifests itself: Marx had proclaimed that capitalism would founder on its contradictions, but these events make it clear that it is socialist planned economies in which the conditions of production are at variance with the productive forces.
- The Communist Party of Italy describes Soviet-style communism as a system "that does not permit any genuine democratic participation, either in production or in political affairs, and thus not only stifles freedom and creative forces but at the same time checks economic dynamism as well as technological and cultural development."
But those who do not read Unita will hear little of this. Instead they will gain the impression that a crisis in the Alliance between Europe and America was sparked off on December 13, 1981, when martial law was imposed in Poland.
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One vital benefit which is struggling to emerge from the prolonged debate about President Reagan's military budget proposals is a recognition that this country and its NATO allies have until now, incredibly, lacked a meaningful and coherent strategy of defense against the Soviet Union. Appreciation of this fact may not yet fully have penetrated the Pentagon or been recognized by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. But it does appear to have reached the White House. The first indication of this came in a little noticed but potentially vastly important statement made by William P. Clark, the President's National Security Adviser, at Georgetown University last May 20. Our new strategy, he declared, would include "diplomatic, political, economic and informational components built on a foundation of military strength." In a limited application of this concept, he noted that "We must force our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings."
Since the end of World War II, Europe and North America have enjoyed an unprecedented era of peace. The central framework for maintaining that peace has been the North Atlantic Alliance and its permanent organization, NATO. Created to secure the West against aggression through a mutual defense system, NATO has proved remarkably successful in meeting a variety of challenges over the years. It has done so because Western leaders and the overwhelming majority of their countrymen have recognized the virtues of collective security for nations whose fundamental interests are held so closely in common.
A 'Lippmann gap' exists when a nation's foreign policy commitments exceed its power. Such a gap existed for the USA by the end of the 1960s, and until 1981 the USA sought to deal with it by reducing commitments and by increasing the role of US allies. President Reagan instead used policies of rhetorical assertion, military build-up, strategic defence, insurgency support, coercive diplomacy and arms control. The next administration's economic inheritance will compel reorganization of the defence establishment, conventional arms cuts, and greater effort by US allies. Concludes that the Lippmann gap will best be coped with by a middle-of-the-road administration.

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