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Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy

By Admiral Stansfield Turner and Captain George Thibault
Fall 1982
Article Summary and Author Biography

The U.S. military establishment is at a historic turning point. It can continue with the same strategy that has dominated its thinking, training and procurement for the past 32 years. That is a concept of prepared defenses and predeployed forces in Europe and in Korea, along with forward-deployed naval forces, on the assumption that being ready for those requirements will automatically be adequate for whatever other contingencies may arise.

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (ret.), was Director of Central Intelligence from 1977 to 1981. Previously, he was Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and President of the Naval War College, among other positions. Captain George Thibault, USN, is Chairman of the Department of Military Strategy at the National War College. The views expressed in this article are personal, and do not imply Department of Defense endorsement of factual accuracy or opinion.

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