Inflexible Response

Are the bases on which Western security in Europe has rested since the Atlantic Alliance has been in existence threatened? Is it true that with the change in generations there is less and less realization in public opinion of the solidarity in destiny of the peoples on both sides of the Ocean? Is it likely that a substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces on the Old Continent could be imposed on the Reagan Administration by Congress? Did the President say what is in the plans of the Pentagon, or did he make a slip of the tongue, when he mentioned the possibility of a nuclear war limited to Europe?

These questions were already on the minds of many responsible leaders in the West, and in the fairly large community of people who reflect on the problems of security, when four prominent American personalities came out, in these pages, with a proposal to move to a declared commitment of "no first use" of nuclear weapons by NATO. A few weeks later Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, speaking at the United Nations Special Conference on Disarmament, committed his country not to make such first use and urged the Western powers to make a similar announcement.

The suggestion of the four Americans was answered in the Summer issue of Foreign Affairs by such qualified persons as General Bernard W. Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes and General Franz-Josef Schulze of the Federal Republic of Germany.1 But, since it raises the most fundamental issue-whether the defense and deterrence concept upheld by the Alliance for more than 30 years is still valid or should be modified-the discussion is likely to last quite a while.