Are the bases on which Western security in Europe has rested since the Atlantic Alliance has been in existence threatened? Is it true that with the change in generations there is less and less realization in public opinion of the solidarity in destiny of the peoples on both sides of the Ocean? Is it likely that a substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces on the Old Continent could be imposed on the Reagan Administration by Congress? Did the President say what is in the plans of the Pentagon, or did he make a slip of the tongue, when he mentioned the possibility of a nuclear war limited to Europe?
François de Rose served as France's Ambassador to NATO from 1970 to 1975. For many years he was connected with French military and civilian nuclear programs. He is the author of La France et la Défense de l'Europe.
Are the bases on which Western security in Europe has rested since the Atlantic Alliance has been in existence threatened? Is it true that with the change in generations there is less and less realization in public opinion of the solidarity in destiny of the peoples on both sides of the Ocean? Is it likely that a substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces on the Old Continent could be imposed on the Reagan Administration by Congress? Did the President say what is in the plans of the Pentagon, or did he make a slip of the tongue, when he mentioned the possibility of a nuclear war limited to Europe?
These questions were already on the minds of many responsible leaders in the West, and in the fairly large community of people who reflect on the problems of security, when four prominent American personalities came out, in these pages, with a proposal to move to a declared commitment of "no first use" of nuclear weapons by NATO. A few weeks later Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, speaking at the United Nations Special Conference on Disarmament, committed his country not to make such first use and urged the Western powers to make a similar announcement.
The suggestion of the four Americans was answered in the Summer issue of Foreign Affairs by such qualified persons as General Bernard W. Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes and General Franz-Josef Schulze of the Federal Republic of Germany.1 But, since it raises the most fundamental issue-whether the defense and deterrence concept upheld by the Alliance for more than 30 years is still valid or should be modified-the discussion is likely to last quite a while.
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NATO began its air war against Yugoslavia with high hopes that the transatlantic relationship would find new purpose through robust humanitarian intervention. Alas, Milosevic remains as entrenched as ever. A messy diplomatic compromise is increasingly likely, but anything less than total victory will have grave consequences for America and its allies. Europe will be wary of cooperating with the United States on security and balk at future engagements that lack U.N. blessing. U.S. isolationists will get plenty more grist for their mill. With its expectations set far too high, NATO will pay the price when they come crashing back to earth.
Since nuclear deterrence began, some of the forces providing deterrence for the West have been stationed in Europe. In the early period, when delivery systems did not yet enjoy intercontinental range, European real estate was essential for America's strategic deterrent. But with new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-based nuclear missiles, introduced in the late 1950s, the U.S. nuclear deterrent no longer required bases in Europe: the age of geographic deterrence identity between the United States and its European allies had come to an end.
Nato's "disarray" has been made into a crisis by President de Gaulle's decision to withdraw French forces and facilities from the integrated structure of the Alliance. For the other NATO powers, and for the United States, this has provided a shock, but-in some ways-a salutary one. The fundamental issues of Europe's future, of Soviet-Western relations and of American policy are now more likely to be addressed. Before the French action these issues would likely have been evaded. Now there still is time to think relatively slowly and carefully about the objectives of the European-American alliance and of the United States itself in Europe's affairs.

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