Reconsiderations: A Decade of Sino-American Relations
While the past decade of Sino-American relations has been largely constructive, the ten years have not been on a steady incline. Rather, there have been two strong forward spurts, from spring 1971 through May 1973, and from May 1978 through early 1980. The relationship has also endured two periods of some acrimony and erosion: from the fall of 1975 to late 1976 and from mid-1980 to the effort to stabilize the relationship reflected in the communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan that was agreed in August 1982. In addition to the periods of rapid forward movement and retrogression, several periods are best portrayed through metaphors such as "plateaus" or "mixed pictures." Even the best periods were punctuated by moments of doubt and uncertainty, while the phases of deterioration were constrained by a common desire to limit the erosion and to preserve a more positive public facade than the private exchanges warranted.
Michel Oksenberg is currently Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan and a Research Associate at its Center for Chinese Studies. He was a member of the staff of the National Security Council, concerned with matters relating to China, from January 1977 to February 1980. He is the author of The Dragon and the Eagle (with Robert Oxnam) and other works.
While the past decade of Sino-American relations has been largely constructive, the ten years have not been on a steady incline. Rather, there have been two strong forward spurts, from spring 1971 through May 1973, and from May 1978 through early 1980. The relationship has also endured two periods of some acrimony and erosion: from the fall of 1975 to late 1976 and from mid-1980 to the effort to stabilize the relationship reflected in the communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan that was agreed in August 1982. In addition to the periods of rapid forward movement and retrogression, several periods are best portrayed through metaphors such as "plateaus" or "mixed pictures." Even the best periods were punctuated by moments of doubt and uncertainty, while the phases of deterioration were constrained by a common desire to limit the erosion and to preserve a more positive public facade than the private exchanges warranted.
The ebb and flow of Sino-American relations merits closer scrutiny to illuminate the forces at work. What produces a forward surge? What halts it? What initiates a downturn? What contains it? A historical review of the past decade, in sum, reveals the interests, objectives, and limits which have inhered in the relationship. The account reveals a subtle interplay among three factors: the state of play in the Sino-Soviet-American triangle, the Taiwan issue, and the domestic political setting in China and the United States.
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