U.S.-Soviet Relations: A Turning Point?

Is an East-West policy necessary, and what should it be? Such a question would seem to go without saying and, in the eyes of countless academics and other observers, requires an affirmative response. More vigorously than ever, they are demanding from their governments, and, above all, from the United States, a "clear," "coherent," and "global" East-West policy. The question will become still more pressing in 1983, which will see the playing out of one of the most difficult matches in the game of nuclear arms negotiations since the beginning of the cold war, after the close of a year marked by two major events. In Moscow, the death of Leonid Brezhnev and the rise to power of Yuri Andropov may offer an opportunity for a new approach to old problems, and open up new perspectives on Soviet behavior. In Washington, in 1982, we have seen Ronald Reagan's policies run into their first serious problems in two areas that are supposed to be the main pillars of his "doctrine" regarding the Soviet Union: the philosophy of trade with the communist nations and the rearmament program.

One must always be wary of abstract doctrines and, in particular, of the terms in which they are expressed. Politics is the art of the possible, and the labels which seem most simple and seductive are those which correspond the least to reality. The 1950s policy of "rollback" was merely a slogan: communism was in no way rolled back during this period. The policy of "global containment" which succeeded it was no more aptly named, since communism was contained neither in Cuba nor in Vietnam. On the contrary, Soviet influence was "rolled back" in areas where such an evolution was scarcely expected, for instance, in Egypt and Somalia. Moreover, does not the use of such simplistic slogans, rather than "defining" a policy, lead to the creation of a "mission impossible" and the inevitable failure to attain the stated goals?