The Central American Quagmire

Summary -- 

The absence of major developments in Central America over the past year has wrought important change: no longer are revolutionary movements about to triumph or be crushed, no longer do insurrections or invasions seem imminent. Rather, Central America has gone from being an ulcer that a new U.S. Administration thought it could lance and heal in a matter of months to a running sore that will plague the United States for years to come.

Alan Riding, who is Mexico Bureau Chief for The New York Times, has reported from Central America since 1971.

The absence of major developments in Central America over the past year has wrought important change: no longer are revolutionary movements about to triumph or be crushed, no longer do insurrections or invasions seem imminent. Rather, Central America has gone from being an ulcer that a new U.S. Administration thought it could lance and heal in a matter of months to a running sore that will plague the United States for years to come.

Leftist guerrillas and ultra-rightists continue to joust without verdict over the ruins of the isthmus. The United States and Cuba remain deeply involved, but seem unsure of the direction of their policies. Peace negotiations are promoted by such third parties as Mexico and Venezuela, but are never actually held. And, without exception, the region's economies are being eroded by high foreign debts, low world commodity prices and shrinking markets for their products. Through stagnation, Central America has become just the sort of problem that solution-oriented officials in Washington traditionally handle badly.

The Reagan Administration, however, shows few signs of adjusting its perceptions to this qualitative change. Rather, it still seems too much under the illusion created during Mr. Reagan's own election campaign-that, at least in Central America, the United States can lay down the law. After all, if President Carter's soft policies permitted leftist expansionism in the region, a hard-line strategy could surely reverse it. The economic, political and historical dynamics of the region were therefore dismissed as largely irrelevant to the basic power play. And the new Administration marched confidently toward the quagmire.

This is a premium article

You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.