"Yellow Rain" and the Future of Arms Agreements
So it seemed to Fred Charles Iklé, then director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1974. He expressed the Ford Administration's support for ratification of a treaty with the comprehensive if awkward title, "Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction." At the same time, he recommended that the Senate ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925, already ratified by all the other major military powers, which prohibited the use of both biological and chemical agents in warfare.
Robert L. Bartley is Editor of The Wall Street Journal. William P. Kucewicz is an editorial-page writer for the Journal; his 1981 articles on "yellow rain" won a Citation for Excellence from the Overseas Press Club of America.
This Convention completely prohibits biological and toxin weapons. Since it provides for the elimination of existing weapons, it is a true disarmament measure."
So it seemed to Fred Charles Iklé, then director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1974. He expressed the Ford Administration's support for ratification of a treaty with the comprehensive if awkward title, "Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction." At the same time, he recommended that the Senate ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925, already ratified by all the other major military powers, which prohibited the use of both biological and chemical agents in warfare.
This seemed entirely appropriate to the full blossom of détente. In November 1969, the same month U.S. and Soviet negotiators opened the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, President Richard Nixon undertook an experiment in unilateral disarmament, unconditionally renouncing all methods of biological warfare. Three months later this renunciation was broadened to include toxin weapons, i.e., poisons produced by biological processes but not themselves living organisms. The Administration set about destroying all stockpiles of biological and toxin weapons, and closing down the research into offensive use of such weapons that had been conducted at Fort Detrick, Maryland.
This U.S. initiative was quick to bear fruit. In early 1971, the Soviet Union dropped its previous insistence that any biological weapons treaty also include chemical weapons, which had created a negotiating deadlock because the United States and Great Britain were unwilling to destroy existing chemical weapons stocks they felt served deterrent purposes. With the Soviets willing to treat biological warfare separately, the Convention was concluded a year later, and was signed by 111 nations.1
The 1972 Convention called for an end to development of biological and toxin weapons. Signatories pledged not to acquire or maintain stocks of biological agents "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes." Existing stocks and delivery equipment were to be destroyed, and transfer of either stocks or technology to third parties was specifically banned...
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Arms control has certainly gone off the tracks. For several years what are called arms negotiations have been mostly a public exchange of accusations; and it often looks as if it is the arms negotiations that are driving the arms race. It is hard to escape the impression that the planned procurement of 50 MX missiles (at latest count) has been an obligation imposed by a doctrine that the end justifies the means--the end something called arms control, and the means a demonstration that the United States does not lack the determination to match or exceed the Soviets in every category of weapons.
Calls for a more pragmatic judgment of the technological implications of military trends. Reviews significance of strategic defence, ICBMs and counterforce, targeting, basing, SLBMs and cruise missiles. Recommends "specific bilateral agreements and judicious unilateral choices in force modernization".
"A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." The words are Ronald Reagan's. While McGeorge Bundy, like many others, finds Reagan's thinking about nuclear weapons muddy and his administration's public presentation of nuclear reality disgraceful, this particular sentence is crystal clear. It echoes the conclusion of the only person ever to authorize a nuclear strike, Harry Truman: "Starting an atomic war is totally unthinkable for rational men."

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