If Voltaire were among us today, and if Candide, his hero, were traveling successively through the various nations of Western Europe, reporting on the deep social and political controversies which surround the question of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), no doubt France would appear to him as a nuclear El Dorado--a Panglossian wonderland where, apparently at least, everyone is/or the French nuclear force, against the Soviet SS-20 missiles, and for the impending NATO deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. Everyone, that is, except for a small but divided minority composed of Communists, some right-wing politicians and analysts, a few left-wing Socialists and a tiny group of die-hard "ecologists." All in all, Candide would draw the conclusion that all is well in Socialist France--at least insofar as nuclear weapons are concerned--and that it must be depressing indeed to be an anti-nuclear "peace" activist in such a bizarre country.
Pierre Lellouche is head of the European Security Program at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris.
If Voltaire were among us today, and if Candide, his hero, were traveling successively through the various nations of Western Europe, reporting on the deep social and political controversies which surround the question of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), no doubt France would appear to him as a nuclear El Dorado-a Panglossian wonderland where, apparently at least, everyone is/or the French nuclear force, against the Soviet SS-20 missiles, and for the impending NATO deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. Everyone, that is, except for a small but divided minority composed of Communists, some right-wing politicians and analysts, a few left-wing Socialists and a tiny group of die-hard "ecologists." All in all, Candide would draw the conclusion that all is well in Socialist France-at least insofar as nuclear weapons are concerned-and that it must be depressing indeed to be an anti-nuclear "peace" activist in such a bizarre country.
To be sure, this judgment would carry some elements of truth: It is a fact that France is reacting quite differently from the rest of the Western world to the nuclear debate provoked by the INF affair. With the exception of a few large demonstrations-mostly orchestrated and dominated by the French Communist Party-there is simply no such thing as a genuine and powerful French "peace movement" analogous to those existing in West Germany, Holland or the United States. In fact, French public opinion reveals a high degree of passivity and indifference vis-à-vis Pershings and the nuclear debate as a whole. Government officials readily interpret this as a "consensus" in support of French security policy, and there again, their assessment is correct-at least in part.
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Our refusal to aid France in developing her nuclear strike force has never lacked American critics. Should we not seek an accommodation with General de Gaulle, trading missile technology and components for coöperation in another military or political field? Increasingly, it is said that we should. Proponents argue that France is well on the road toward acquiring her force de frappe, despite our opposition which has embittered French officials and made their program slower and more expensive. The bitterness and higher cost leave France both less willing and less able to support common enterprises, including the provision of modern French divisions to NATO and toleration of American-controlled nuclear weapons on her territory. It is said that these are unpleasant consequences of American policy, especially as they are felt by one honored major ally and not another. If we should supply Skybolt missiles to the United Kingdom for its Bomber Command, should we not assist France in some comparable way? Especially if France pays for it and eases our troubled balance of payments?
Both the United States and France benefited from the geopolitical freeze during the Cold War. Now that the bipolar stalemate is over, Germany is preoccupied with reunification, England is economically hobbled and blanches at the European Community, and migration of the rising populations of North Africa and the Middle East may soon threaten more disruption than post-Soviet states. France alone among its neighbors has the desire, ambition and means to lead the reordering of Europe's security. Yet its efforts must fuse with U.S. policy, not snuff it out.
How can the United States and Europe mend the Western alliance after the split over Iraq? Some Europeans now favor engaging America head on, by building an independent military. But the best answer lies in complementarity, not competition. The two sides should focus on common goals, with each doing what it does best.
