Democracy and Debt in South America: A Continent's Dilemma
Article Summary and Author Biography
Democracy and debt were a macabre pas de deux in South America during 1983. As military regimes withdrew in disgrace (Argentina), further liberalized (Brazil), or tried to cope with vigorous popular pressures to restore democracy (Uruguay and Chile), that welcome news was haunted by the growing social and political implications of the continent's economic difficulties. The growing foreign debt burden has become the most visible manifestation of the current economic crisis, the worst in more than 50 years.
Riordan Roett is Professor and Director of the Latin American Studies Program, and Director of the Center of Brazilian Studies, at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington D.C. He is the co-editor (with Wolf Grabendorff) and a contributor to a forthcoming book on the triangular relations of Latin America with Western Europe and the United States. The third edition of his book, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society, will appear in 1984. He traveled extensively in Latin America during 1983 conducting interviews and collecting material for this article. Dr. Roett was President of the Latin American Studies Association in 1978 and a consultant to the second Linowitz commission.
Democracy and debt were a macabre pas de deux in South America during 1983. As military regimes withdrew in disgrace (Argentina), further liberalized (Brazil), or tried to cope with vigorous popular pressures to restore democracy (Uruguay and Chile), that welcome news was haunted by the growing social and political implications of the continent's economic difficulties. The growing foreign debt burden has become the most visible manifestation of the current economic crisis, the worst in more than 50 years.
The quality of life has deteriorated dramatically in most of the countries of South America, largely as a result of stabilization programs and austerity measures implemented in 1983. Outbursts of rioting and growing street demonstrations indicate a decreasing tolerance for belt-tightening among the poor and middle sectors of the populations. Many ask if it is possible for fragile democratic institutions to meet the demands of the International Monetary Fund and the international private commercial banks, and simultaneously to respond to the expectations and needs of their citizens.
U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere in 1983 continued to emphasize what the Reagan Administration has taken to be America's "backyard" in Central America and the Caribbean. Indeed, the early twentieth-century reality of the "big stick" and "gunboat diplomacy" returned for many observers as American troops landed in Grenada, the number of U.S. advisers increased in Central America, U.S. covert aid for guerrillas became overt, and American warships steamed off the coast of Central America. These actions were a warning to unfriendly governments that the Reagan Administration was committed to a reassertion of what it perceived as U.S. vital interests in the region. Headlines trumpeted the meandering of the Contadora Group (a regional peace initiative by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) as well as the deliberations of the Kissinger Commission for Central America.
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.