The Politics of Vulnerability: 1980-83
As the Soviet Union has steadily improved its strategic nuclear and other military forces in recent years, it has become increasingly clear to Americans that the United States is vulnerable in a sense that was never true before the advent of nuclear weapons.
R. James Woolsey is a partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Shea and Gardner, and counsel to the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. In 1977-79 he was Under Secretary of the Navy; in 1970-73, General Counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee; and in 1969-70, an adviser on the SALT I delegation. During 1983 he was a member of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission) and in 1981 he served on the first Townes Committee-both described herein. In October 1983 he was appointed Delegate-at-Large on the U.S. START delegation at Geneva.
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For the Reagan Administration, 1983 was to be "the year of the missile." It was to be the moment of truth in the American effort to introduce new intermediate-range weapons into Western Europe and to "modernize" the U.S. strategic arsenal, primarily with the development of the MX intercontinental missile. Until this buildup in defenses was well under way, nuclear arms control would be a matter of keeping up appearances, of limiting damage, of buying time, and of laying the ground for possible agreement later.
Arms control has certainly gone off the tracks. For several years what are called arms negotiations have been mostly a public exchange of accusations; and it often looks as if it is the arms negotiations that are driving the arms race. It is hard to escape the impression that the planned procurement of 50 MX missiles (at latest count) has been an obligation imposed by a doctrine that the end justifies the means--the end something called arms control, and the means a demonstration that the United States does not lack the determination to match or exceed the Soviets in every category of weapons.
Calls for a more pragmatic judgment of the technological implications of military trends. Reviews significance of strategic defence, ICBMs and counterforce, targeting, basing, SLBMs and cruise missiles. Recommends "specific bilateral agreements and judicious unilateral choices in force modernization".
