The Star Wars Debate: Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion of Security
Toward the end of what almost immediately came to be called his "Star Wars" speech in March of 1983, President Reagan concluded an impassioned defense of his arms budget by proposing that American scientists begin research on a very advanced system that could protect the West from ballistic missile attack by the turn of the century or soon thereafter.
William E. Burrows is Director of the Science and Environmental Reporting Program at New York University. He has written on aeronautics and astronautics for more than twenty years, for various magazines and as a reporter for The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal. He is currently working on a book on strategic reconnaissance and national security.
Toward the end of what almost immediately came to be called his "Star Wars" speech in March of 1983, President Reagan concluded an impassioned defense of his arms budget by proposing that American scientists begin research on a very advanced system that could protect the West from ballistic missile attack by the turn of the century or soon thereafter.
"What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?," the President asked, rhetorically. The effect of the statement was to make public his belief that an effective ballistic missile defense (BMD) might well be feasible and, if so, that it could lead to an arms control breakthrough of monumental proportions while guaranteeing the safety of the nations of the Western Alliance.
The reference to ballistic missile defense was the catalyst for the creation of two blue-ribbon panels, composed for the most part of aerospace specialists from industry, think tanks, research institutions and the Pentagon. After spending the summer studying the problem, the panels submitted reports in mid-autumn which came to the conclusion that an effective ballistic missile defense is so promising that an initial five-year research effort is warranted at a cost of about $26 billion (or nearly as much as it took to land men on the moon). The goal, according to a combined report, is to have a multilayered ballistic missile defense in place within 20 years at a cost estimated at between $250-$500 billion. The panels' conclusions, which were heartily endorsed by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and applauded by the trade press, touched off a frenzy of activity within the industry and among a wide variety of defense-dependent research institutions.
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The reelection of Ronald Reagan makes the future of his Strategic Defense Initiative the most important question of nuclear arms competition and arms control on the national agenda since 1972. The President is strongly committed to this program, and senior officials, including Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, have made it clear that he plans to intensify this effort in his second term. Sharing the gravest reservations about this undertaking, and believing that unless it is radically constrained during the next four years it will bring vast new costs and dangers to our country and to mankind, we think it urgent to offer an assessment of the nature and hazards of this initiative, to call for the closest vigilance by Congress and the public, and even to invite the victorious President to reconsider. While we write only after obtaining the best technical advice we could find, our central concerns are political. We believe the President_s initiative to be a classic case of good intentions that will have bad results because they do not respect reality.
On March 23, 1983, President Reagan delivered a televised speech to the nation in which he initiated a potentially radical departure in U.S. strategic policy. The President suggested that the policy of nuclear deterrence through the threat of strategic nuclear retaliation is inadequate, and called upon the vast American technological community to examine the potential for effective defense against ballistic missiles.
The program known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) includes research on a variety of technologies--many aimed at distinct phases of the ballistic missile flight path. For each phase--boost, post-boost, mid-course and terminal --a defense would require successful surveillance, target acquisition, tracking, guidance of the weapons, and kill mechanisms. Are the objectives of SDI technically feasible? The answer will depend primarily on what specific objectives strategic defenses ultimately seek to achieve--protection of population, of missile silos, of other military targets. Within that context, the answer will further depend on the capabilities of the technologies and on the potential countermeasures and counter-countermeasures of each side.
