American-Soviet relations can be approached in two ways. One approach avails itself of the techniques of meteorology, in that it concentrates on taking regular readings of the East-West climate as manifested in the level of rhetoric emanating from Washington and Moscow, the prevalence or absence of dialogues and negotiations, and the intensity of their competition in regions outside their immediate control. This approach is favored by journalists because it focuses on concrete events which they can report as news and subject to instant analysis. It also prevails in liberal circles whose adherents believe that there exist no genuine differences of either values or interests among nations and that such conflicts as do occur derive from mutual misunderstanding or lack of conciliatory spirit, mainly on the part of U.S. administrations.
Richard Pipes is Baird Professor of History at Harvard. In 1981-82 he served as Director of East European and Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council. His books include The Formation of the Soviet Union, Russia Under the Old Regime and U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente. He is presently working on a history of the Russian Revolution. This article is an expanded version of a section in the author's forthcoming book, Survival Is Not Enough, to be published by Simon & Schuster. Copyright (c) 1984 by Richard Pipes.
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