In this fortieth anniversary year of the international monetary conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, there have been numerous but vague calls for a new Bretton Woods conference to improve our international monetary system which, if not actually ailing, at least leaves many participants uneasy and discomfited. Much of the discomfort relates to the large and burdensome external debt that has accumulated around the world, but much also goes beyond debt to the underlying monetary arrangements among countries.
Richard N. Cooper is the Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economics at Harvard University. He was Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs during 1977-1981, and Provost of Yale University in 1972-74. He is the author of The Economics of Interdependence and other works. This article draws on a paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston to honor the fortieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods Conference. Copyright (c) 1984 Richard N. Cooper.
We're sorry, but Foreign Affairs does not have the copyright to display this article online.
Related
The recent G-20 meeting in Toronto ended with the world's largest economies promising to cut deficit spending. But such a course is unwise and unlikely to lead to growth -- it is time for finance ministers to take on the speculators who are calling for retrenchment.
Does the current financial crisis resemble Japan's "lost decade" of the 1990s? It may be even worse, argues Robert Madsen. Not so, replies Richard Katz.
The performance of the world economy in 1983 is difficult to characterize. For the industrialized market economies--members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development--it was the year of the long-awaited recovery after the second oil shock of 1979-80. World trade began to revive after two years of stagnation and decline. There was continuing good news about inflation in the OECD area. Business and especially consumer confidence improved. A major rupture in the world financial system was averted through effective, concerted crisis management led by the International Monetary Fund, whose role was further enhanced by an infusion of new resources. The heavily-indebted developing countries demonstrated considerable progress in external adjustment: indeed the largest Latin American debtors accomplished an amazing turnaround in trade performance.
