The World Economy: The Dollar and the Summit
The next annual economic summit is scheduled to be held in Bonn in May 1985. What follows is a more or less fanciful account of its proceedings--not a prediction of the eventual reality, but a depiction of where present domestic and international economic trends are leading. Foremost among these trends is the growth of the U.S. trade and budget deficits. Conceivably, by next May, the actors at the Bonn Summit will have seen signs that these deficits are being reduced. More likely they will not, and the Summit will open in full awareness of the dangers that these deficits pose to the global economy.
Henry Owen was, from 1977 through 1980, a U.S. ambassador-at-large responsible for U.S. preparations for the annual economic summits held by the heads of government of the seven main industrial democracies. Before that he served in the State Department, his last position there being head of the Policy Planning Council. He is now a principal of the Consultants International Group in Washington.
The next annual economic summit is scheduled to be held in Bonn in May 1985. What follows is a more or less fanciful account of its proceedings-not a prediction of the eventual reality, but a depiction of where present domestic and international economic trends are leading. Foremost among these trends is the growth of the U.S. trade and budget deficits. Conceivably, by next May, the actors at the Bonn Summit will have seen signs that these deficits are being reduced. More likely they will not, and the Summit will open in full awareness of the dangers that these deficits pose to the global economy.
The dramatization that follows aims to portray what might happen in the absence of effective measures to avert these dangers. Any resemblance between the heads of government described herein and those now in office is, as they say, purely coincidental. The scenario is illuminated by the author's experience as a "sherpa" at the summits of 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980.
The time is May 1985. The scene is a large building in the federal government compound in the West German capital, which is distinguished from other nearby buildings mainly by its lack of distinction. Its style is 1905 functional. Two sentries from the German armed forces stand at the entry. They present arms as each of eight political leaders-the heads of government of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Great Britain and the United States, and the President of the European Community-enters. The 1985 Bonn Economic Summit of the seven major industrial democracies is about to begin.
This is the ninth in a series of summits which started in 1975, when President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France convened the first meeting at Rambouillet. Since the 1970s, the heads of government have moved away from detailed and specific summit agreements. They prefer substantive exchanges that do not require major changes in the participants' policies. That is what they achieved at Ottawa in 1981, Versailles in 1982, Williamsburg in 1983 and London in 1984: useful discussions, rather than agreement on new actions.
The need to do more, however, is in their minds as the gavel of the German Chancellor calls them to order. This need has been underlined by recent events.
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The United States is now engaged in a divisive debate over international trade. On one side are disciples of the principle of free trade--the touchstone of American trade policy in the postwar era. Free traders argue that the interests of the United States, and of the world, continue to lie in reducing barriers, subsidies and other government interventions which distort the natural pattern of specialization and trade among countries. On the other side are those calling for policies to protect American industry from foreign competition. Protectionists argue that imports are causing massive unemployment and eroding the nation's industrial base.
In recent years, American policy at home and abroad has seemed more pressed by events and less sure of its responses than at any time since the late 1940s. Since World War II, the guiding ideals of policy have been neo-Keynesian "full-employment" at home and neo-Wilsonian leadership abroad. It is difficult to count the achievements unimpressive. Along with an unparalleled domestic prosperity, America's leadership and power have coaxed the world into a structure of collective security and liberal economic interdependence--a pax Americana that has been, on balance, the happiest era of this troubled century. The present disarray of American policy arises from two broad trends that have increasingly undermined both its domestic and foreign achievements. The first is the apparently relentless acceleration of domestic inflation--a process that involves increasingly violent swings of the business cycle and a progressive stagnation of real growth and competitiveness. The second is the deterioration of American power abroad and, with it, the disintegration of the pax Americana.
Economies are like bicycles. The faster they move, the better they maintain their balance unaided. An economy experiencing rapid growth can adjust with relative ease to changes in supply, demand and technology. Workers whose jobs are threatened because of new products, shifts in consumer tastes, or automation can find new jobs; communities whose major industries are failing can attract new industry; and firms whose products are becoming less competitive can diversify into more competitive lines of business. All these adjustments, in turn, help ensure continued growth.
