In 1955, just after the summit meeting between President Eisenhower, General Secretary Khrushchev and Prime Minister Bulganin in Geneva, Chip Bohlen, then our ambassador to the Soviet Union, invited my family and me to stay at the American ambassador's residence in Moscow. At that time the British ambassador in Moscow was Sir William Hayter. There was a story that Hayter, when asked what it was like to negotiate with the Russians, had said it was rather like dealing with a defective vending machine. You put in a coin and nothing comes out. There may be some sense in shaking it, you may get your coin back; but there is no point in talking to it.
Ambassador Paul H. Nitze is Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament negotiations. He has held numerous positions in the Federal Government since 1941, including Vice-Chairman of the Strategic Bombing Survey, Director of State Department Policy Planning Staff, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Secretary of the Navy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Representative of the Secretary of Defense of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, and head of the U.S. Delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations. The views expressed in this article are Ambassador Nitze's and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Government.
In 1955, just after the summit meeting between President Eisenhower, General Secretary Khrushchev and Prime Minister Bulganin in Geneva, Chip Bohlen, then our ambassador to the Soviet Union, invited my family and me to stay at the American ambassador's residence in Moscow. At that time the British ambassador in Moscow was Sir William Hayter. There was a story that Hayter, when asked what it was like to negotiate with the Russians, had said it was rather like dealing with a defective vending machine. You put in a coin and nothing comes out. There may be some sense in shaking it, you may get your coin back; but there is no point in talking to it.
Hayter's statement, like most witty remarks, is a gross overstatement, but there is a kernel of truth in it. It can serve as a starting point for a review of the differences and difficulties that have beset the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union.
II
First, we have to consider how the Communists think that policy should be analyzed. They start with the proposition that there are certain fundamental theses that distinguish the Communist approach to the world from that of others, particularly from that of the capitalist world. Among these theses are the primacy of the class struggle and the continuing fight against "imperialism" in the formerly colonial world. These theses they hold to be unchangeable.
They also have a somewhat more flexible view with respect to strategy. They think that strategy should, from time to time, be altered to reflect changes in the "correlation of forces." In the correlation of forces they include not only military forces, but economic, political and psychological factors as well. When the correlation of forces is favorable to their ends, their doctrine calls on them to exploit that favorable correlation by moving forward. When the correlation of forces is negative, the doctrine calls upon them to hold or to retreat while they attempt to reverse the adverse trends. With respect to tactics, the Communists believe there should be great flexibility. The guiding thoughts should be deception and surprise.
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
Asks (1) why the postwar Soviet thrust for hegemony over Western Eurasia seemed a possible dream to Moscow (2) why the US reaction came so late. Answers that (1) it involved mixed impulses of fear and ambition deeply rooted in Russia's history, ideology and technological capacity (2) US foreign policy had a strong antagonism to the Old World balance-of-power politics. This came to an end with the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan. But the cold war which ensued will have a 'soft landing' rather than turn hot, because the USSR is not a great power in the new technological and educational revolutions which will be the bases of power in the future. The problems are now how to harness the new bases of power and how to prevent any one state from achieving hegemony. This picture of the modern world, largely constructed and painted by the USA, is slowly being perceived by the USSR.
We met, as we had to meet," President Reagan told Congress in November on his return from Geneva. A week later General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev said to the Supreme Soviet, "A dialogue of top leaders is always a moment of truth in relations between states." 1985 became the year of the summit, of a faster tempo and a softer tone in U.S.-Soviet relations. The President's invitation to meet, issued in March, had been his very first message to the new Soviet leader and reflected a widespread hope that the passing of the Kremlin's "old men" might permit East-West conciliation. Yet the leaders' more direct involvement and even their apparently amiable personal relationship could hardly resolve the contentious issues between the two sides. For this purpose, the relative strength of their bargaining positions remained decisive. In the course of the year, each side therefore sought to overcome those problems that in the past had weakened it in the superpower competition.
What wise men had promised has not happened. What the damned fools predicted has actually come to pass," exclaimed Lord Melbourne during one of the British politician's fits of exasperation over the situation in Ireland. Well, viewing the post-World War II course of Soviet-American relations, one is tempted to echo the nineteenth-century statesman's sentiments.
