U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Return of Arms Control
On November 23, 1983, the Soviet Union walked out of the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations in Geneva and shortly thereafter suspended the strategic arms talks, thus closing down all U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations.
Arnold L. Horelick is Director of the Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior and served as National Intelligence Officer for the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe in Washington, D.C., from 1977 to 1980. Portions of this article draw heavily on a paper by the writer and Edward L. Warner III (_U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Arms Control: The Next Phase_) presented on October 19, 1984, at a conference on U.S.-Soviet relations sponsored by the Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior. The writer wishes to acknowledge the contribution of his colleague, Mr. Warner. Copyright © 1985 by Arnold Horelick.
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