Nineteen eighty-four was a year of realignment throughout the Middle East, a year not of the soldier, but of the diplomat and the politician. The war in Lebanon abated; the war in the Persian Gulf sputtered along without clear outcome or design. Syrian's renewed ascendancy in Lebanon and the continuing threat to the whole region from Iran's militancy contributed to an intense round of diplomatic maneuver among moderate Arab countries, notably Egypt and Jordan. The United States, extricated from its Lebanese misadventure, helped to limit the Gulf war and provided military support to friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Soviet Union, taking stock of a series of substantial setbacks in the region since 1979, and finding Syria and Libya to be less than reliable partners, was striving to extend its diplomatic influence among those same Arab moderates, either directly or through its only faithful protégé, South Yemen.
Dankwart A. Rustow is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York Graduate School. His most recent book is Oil and Turmoil: America Faces OPEC and the Middle East.
Nineteen eighty-four was a year of realignment throughout the Middle East, a year not of the soldier, but of the diplomat and the politician. The war in Lebanon abated; the war in the Persian Gulf sputtered along without clear outcome or design. Syrian’s renewed ascendancy in Lebanon and the continuing threat to the whole region from Iran’s militancy contributed to an intense round of diplomatic maneuver among moderate Arab countries, notably Egypt and Jordan. The United States, extricated from its Lebanese misadventure, helped to limit the Gulf war and provided military support to friendly countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Soviet Union, taking stock of a series of substantial setbacks in the region since 1979, and finding Syria and Libya to be less than reliable partners, was striving to extend its diplomatic influence among those same Arab moderates, either directly or through its only faithful protégé, South Yemen.
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran was unwavering in its revolutionary rhetoric and its determination to eliminate domestic rivals such as the Tudeh (Communist) Party. Eager to break the stalemate with Iraq, it periodically threatened to extend the war southward to other Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Yet, in its continuing acute need for earnings from oil exports and for imports of weapons, Teheran felt some incentive to present a more normal diplomatic image to the world at large.
Israel went from war in Lebanon into the most severe economic crisis since the founding of the state. The Israeli system responded to the challenge with the formation of a remarkable, broad national coalition which, if it could endure, held substantial promise of political as well as economic regeneration. And Turkey, well along in its own recovery from an earlier economic and political crisis, reaffirmed its role as America’s oldest ally in the region even as it reached out for closer economic and political relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors.
President Reagan’s September 1982 plan for a West Bank and Gaza settlement "in association with Jordan" had been pushed aside by the year-and-a-half intervention in Lebanon. Yet, given the new diplomatic activity of Jordan, Egypt and others late in 1984, the plan gained new relevance, although it may have to compete, in the years ahead, with the notion of a more comprehensive Middle East peace conference which Moscow launched in mid-1984...
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The Reagan Administration reached some important conclusions about Middle East policy during its first term. In 1985, it tried to apply them. The framework for its diplomatic activism had been laid down in the September 1982 Reagan Plan, but to this were now added calculations on the difficulty of mediating an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, the need to await decisive action by the involved regional states, a skepticism about Arab eagerness for negotiations, and the belief that the United States must stand its ground until the proper opportunity for peace arrived.
If either Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan needed any special persuasion to become convinced of the centrality of the Middle East in the total picture of American foreign policy, harsh experience provided it. The former had some notable diplomatic successes in the region, the Camp David accords and the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, but he struggled through the final year of his presidency under the impact of two shattering events--the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However history may judge his efforts to cope with them, there was no avoiding the impression of a humiliated and frustrated America which must have contributed to his electoral defeat in November 1980. President Reagan came into office determined to restore American strength and prestige, but one year later his Administration, shocked by the assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt, at odds with Israel after a series of disputes culminating in the barbed exchange following Israel's de facto annexation of the Golan Heights, and unable either to put aside the Palestine problem or make any progress toward settling it, was still groping for a political structure on which to build the position of strength deemed necessary to hold off the Russians and protect vital oil supplies.
The war on terror has bound Israel and the United States closer together. But it has also deepened the rift between them and Arab and Muslim countries that rally behind the Palestinians. Peace in the Middle East has never seemed more elusive.

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