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Nuclear Strategy: Can There Be a Happy Ending?

By Fred Charles Iklé
Spring 1985
Article Summary and Author Biography

Our policies for preventing nuclear war, mercifully, have never been tested to the point of failure. This cannot be said of our policies that have sought to reverse, or at least to halt, the expansion of nuclear arsenals threatening our annihilation. For more than two decades now, the United States, using both diplomacy and self-restraint, has tried--and failed--to halt the nuclear arms competition with the Soviet Union.

Fred Charles Iklé has been the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy since 1981. He was Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, 1973-76.

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