The year 1985 saw progress on several important fronts. The American recovery entered its fourth year; inflation continued its impressive decline and interest rates fell significantly. Washington took a more constructive approach toward the resolution of international economic problems. In much of Europe, wage and price increases were further slowed, business profitability was improved, budget deficits were cut and cumbersome regulations were loosened. Japan took new steps to liberalize trade and finance. The United States joined with Britain, France, Japan and West Germany to reduce exchange rate misalignments and bring greater order to the international monetary system. Growth picked up in some Latin American countries, and the world's two most populous nations, China and India, substantially increased market incentives.
Robert D. Hormats is a Vice President at Goldman, Sachs & Co., and Director of Goldman, Sachs International Corp. He was on the senior staff of the National Security Council from 1974 to 1977, when he became Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the economics bureau. Subsequently he served as Deputy U.S. Trade Representative. In 1981, he was named Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs.
The year 1985 saw progress on several important fronts. The American recovery entered its fourth year; inflation continued its impressive decline and interest rates fell significantly. Washington took a more constructive approach toward the resolution of international economic problems. In much of Europe, wage and price increases were further slowed, business profitability was improved, budget deficits were cut and cumbersome regulations were loosened. Japan took new steps to liberalize trade and finance. The United States joined with Britain, France, Japan and West Germany to reduce exchange rate misalignments and bring greater order to the international monetary system. Growth picked up in some Latin American countries, and the world’s two most populous nations, China and India, substantially increased market incentives.
But there were ominous trouble spots. The large U.S. budget deficit endangered future prosperity. A still very strong dollar penalized American industry and agriculture, and the U.S. trade deficit reached another historic peak. The United States became a net debtor to the rest of the world for the first time since World War I; by the end of 1986, U.S. foreign debt will likely exceed the foreign debts of Mexico and Brazil combined. Europe’s efforts to cut joblessness also proved disappointing, and structural rigidities there slowed investment. The international trade picture grew more dangerous, as nations imposed import restrictions and increased subsidies, U.S.-Japanese frictions sharply intensified, and only limited progress was made toward beginning new multilateral trade negotiations. Latin America’s debt remained a barrier to its development, a threat to its political stability, and a serious impediment to world growth. Much of Africa suffered from tragic food and nutritional problems and experienced continued economic deterioration.
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Bringing the newly market-oriented countries of Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe into the global economy would harness the productive capacity of some three billion people. But increased resistance to free trade has cut the supply of political tolerance for another global trade round anytime soon. An expansion of regional trading areas such as the European Union and NAFTA promises the greatest progress, but international e»orts must keep regional blocs from becoming protectionist and ensure they are compatible with the global trade regime.
Mexico has suffered through four major crises in the past two decades, but the current round, triggered by the 1994 collapse of the peso, is the most serious. Although Mexico will avoid a social explosion, it will not embark on the thorough reform it desperately needs. The reason: a large, broad minority that depends on the United States and is mainly indifferent to their country's ups and downs, economic and political. Successive American bailouts have spared Mexicans some pain but have also locked in misguided policies and an authoritarian government. Until bold new leaders arise, Mexico is condemned to repeat its sad history.
Increasing aid and market access for poor countries makes sense but will not do that much good. Wealthy nations should also push other measures that could be far more rewarding, such as giving the poor more control over economic policy, financing new development-friendly technologies, and opening labor markets.
