We met, as we had to meet," President Reagan told Congress in November on his return from Geneva. A week later General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev said to the Supreme Soviet, "A dialogue of top leaders is always a moment of truth in relations between states." 1985 became the year of the summit, of a faster tempo and a softer tone in U.S.-Soviet relations. The President's invitation to meet, issued in March, had been his very first message to the new Soviet leader and reflected a widespread hope that the passing of the Kremlin's "old men" might permit East-West conciliation. Yet the leaders' more direct involvement and even their apparently amiable personal relationship could hardly resolve the contentious issues between the two sides. For this purpose, the relative strength of their bargaining positions remained decisive. In the course of the year, each side therefore sought to overcome those problems that in the past had weakened it in the superpower competition.
Jeremy R. Azrael recently joined the senior staff of the Rand Corporation after three years as a member of the secretary of states Policy Planning Council. From 1961 to 1981 he was professor of political science and chairman of the Committee on Slavic Area Studies at the University of Chicago. Stephen Sestanovich is a Soviet specialist on the National Security Council staff. The views expressed here are the authors own and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the U.S. government.
We met, as we had to meet," President Reagan told Congress in November on his return from Geneva. A week later General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev said to the Supreme Soviet, "A dialogue of top leaders is always a moment of truth in relations between states."
1985 became the year of the summit, of a faster tempo and a softer tone in U.S.-Soviet relations. The President’s invitation to meet, issued in March, had been his very first message to the new Soviet leader and reflected a widespread hope that the passing of the Kremlin’s "old men" might permit East-West conciliation. Yet the leaders’ more direct involvement and even their apparently amiable personal relationship could hardly resolve the contentious issues between the two sides. For this purpose, the relative strength of their bargaining positions remained decisive. In the course of the year, each side therefore sought to overcome those problems that in the past had weakened it in the superpower competition.
For the United States, two problems continued to stand above the rest: the Soviet strategic nuclear buildup and Moscow’s military engagement, both direct and indirect, in the Third World. Both preoccupations date back to the decline of détente in the late 1970s; they figured prominently in the rhetoric of candidate Reagan in 1980 and then in the policies of the President’s first term. In the past year the Administration focused on two responses that are likely to be remembered as the most distinctive elements of its diplomacy: the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and support for anti-communist insurgencies. These measures were the only foreign policy matters touched on in the President’s second inaugural address. They dominated the American foreign policy debate in 1985 (and meeting a crucial test of seriousness, acquired nicknames that have stuck—"Star Wars" and the "Reagan Doctrine").
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What wise men had promised has not happened. What the damned fools predicted has actually come to pass," exclaimed Lord Melbourne during one of the British politician's fits of exasperation over the situation in Ireland. Well, viewing the post-World War II course of Soviet-American relations, one is tempted to echo the nineteenth-century statesman's sentiments.
In 1955, just after the summit meeting between President Eisenhower, General Secretary Khrushchev and Prime Minister Bulganin in Geneva, Chip Bohlen, then our ambassador to the Soviet Union, invited my family and me to stay at the American ambassador's residence in Moscow. At that time the British ambassador in Moscow was Sir William Hayter. There was a story that Hayter, when asked what it was like to negotiate with the Russians, had said it was rather like dealing with a defective vending machine. You put in a coin and nothing comes out. There may be some sense in shaking it, you may get your coin back; but there is no point in talking to it.
Asks (1) why the postwar Soviet thrust for hegemony over Western Eurasia seemed a possible dream to Moscow (2) why the US reaction came so late. Answers that (1) it involved mixed impulses of fear and ambition deeply rooted in Russia's history, ideology and technological capacity (2) US foreign policy had a strong antagonism to the Old World balance-of-power politics. This came to an end with the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan. But the cold war which ensued will have a 'soft landing' rather than turn hot, because the USSR is not a great power in the new technological and educational revolutions which will be the bases of power in the future. The problems are now how to harness the new bases of power and how to prevent any one state from achieving hegemony. This picture of the modern world, largely constructed and painted by the USA, is slowly being perceived by the USSR.
