The Reagan Administration reached some important conclusions about Middle East policy during its first term. In 1985, it tried to apply them. The framework for its diplomatic activism had been laid down in the September 1982 Reagan Plan, but to this were now added calculations on the difficulty of mediating an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, the need to await decisive action by the involved regional states, a skepticism about Arab eagerness for negotiations, and the belief that the United States must stand its ground until the proper opportunity for peace arrived.
Barry Rubin, a 1984-85 Council on Foreign Relations fellow in the office of Senator Gary Hart (D.-Colo.), is now a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His latest book is Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy. Copyright © 1986 by Barry Rubin.
The Reagan Administration reached some important conclusions about Middle East policy during its first term. In 1985, it tried to apply them. The framework for its diplomatic activism had been laid down in the September 1982 Reagan Plan, but to this were now added calculations on the difficulty of mediating an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, the need to await decisive action by the involved regional states, a skepticism about Arab eagerness for negotiations, and the belief that the United States must stand its ground until the proper opportunity for peace arrived.
In contrast to previous years, there was no regional crisis to force dramatic U.S. action. Nor was there any major upsurge of Arab-Israeli tension, internal upheaval, or threat to Persian Gulf security brought on by Islamic fundamentalist revolutionaries or a widening Iran-Iraq war. Instead, there were experiments with new political alignments, including cooperation among Iraq, Jordan and Egypt, between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and even, at year’s end, between Jordan and Syria.
Fresh ideas were developed for forming a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, frameworks for an international conference, and formulas for mutual Arab-Israeli recognition. While diplomatic maneuvers made little material progress in 1985, the channels opened might still provide a foundation for future breakthroughs. The two sides are still far apart, but some kind of negotiated solution seems more imaginable now than ever before.
Arab-Israeli peace is but an important aspect, rather than the sole consideration, of U.S. regional objectives, which continued to be defined by four principles: limiting Soviet influence while maximizing its own; encouraging regional stability against the danger of war or radical revolutions; supporting and strengthening allies; and assuring the continued supply of oil at reasonable prices. While, as always, there were numerous points of danger and tension in the Middle East, in 1985 the overall picture in regard to these four concerns was a reasonably positive one.
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American peacekeeping turned into American bloodletting in 1983. More than any event since the war and oil embargo almost exactly ten years earlier, the October 23 suicide bombing of Marine headquarters in Beirut brought the Middle East conflict home directly to vast numbers of Americans stunned by the carnage that eventually claimed 241 lives--more casualties than in any other single incident since the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam.
Given the summer's immersion in day-to-day death and destruction in Lebanon, we need to begin putting the Israeli-Palestinian War of 1982 in larger perspective. For better or worse, it will mark a turning point in the history of Israel, in the course of Arab-Israeli relations, in U.S.-Israeli relations, in the political character and orientation of important Middle Eastern states, and in the U.S. position in that critical area.
SINCE early March the Arab world has been shaken by an angry clash of views about its relations with Israel. Arab thinking on this subject had long been governed by what Whitehead once called "inert ideas"-that is to say, ideas that are merely received into the mind without being utilized or tested or thrown into fresh combinations. This inertia was suddenly broken by two closely related events. The Federal Republic of Germany sought the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, in conscious rejection of Arab pressure. And the President of Tunisia challenged the official Arab dogma about Israel's place in the Middle East. In statements which had a broad international resonance, Mr. Bourguiba indicated that Israel was a solid and entrenched reality with which the Arab nations would have to come to terms. To dream of sweeping Israel away in a torrent of violence was, in his view, sheer delusion.
