Failure on the part of the superpowers to negotiate on strategic nuclear weapons could bring about the end of arms control as a tool of international politics. Various technical and political problems with 'deep cuts' are outlined, and cuts of between 25% and 30% are advocated as sufficient to allay public concern, but not so great as to put deterrence in jeopardy. Internal debate on SDI should not hinder this process.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., is Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and author of Nuclear Ethics.
The United States and the Soviet Union have resumed negotiations for another summit meeting. In contrast to the first encounter between President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev, if this meeting takes place it will be difficult to avoid the specific issues of strategic arms control. Both sides have recently advanced new proposals. At the same time, however, the United States has distanced itself from the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaty, which expired at the end of 1985. Thus, failure to make progress at the summit, or in the Geneva talks, could leave the two sides without any agreed framework for strategic arms control, except for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which would then be in jeopardy.
President Reagan raised a political furor last May when he announced his intention to cease observing the limits of the unratified SALT II treaty. Congressional critics passed resolutions of disapproval and allies sent messages of alarm. They and other critics feared the decision meant the effective end of arms control. Whether the SALT decision will prove to be a major turning point away from arms control, the prelude to a new framework or a minor episode in domestic politics is highly uncertain. Even if it proves to be a turning point, there is disagreement on whether that will be good or bad for U.S. security.
Some strategists, inside and outside the Reagan Administration, consider not only SALT but the whole concept of formal arms control negotiations to be an obsolete remnant of the 1970s. They believe that arms control has diverted attention and distorted priorities in the U.S. defense program. In order to analyze the problems and potential of the President’s decision, we need first to understand how we got to the current situation.
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For the Reagan Administration, 1983 was to be "the year of the missile." It was to be the moment of truth in the American effort to introduce new intermediate-range weapons into Western Europe and to "modernize" the U.S. strategic arsenal, primarily with the development of the MX intercontinental missile. Until this buildup in defenses was well under way, nuclear arms control would be a matter of keeping up appearances, of limiting damage, of buying time, and of laying the ground for possible agreement later.
Freed from fixation on the struggle against the USSR, the USA "will need to think more broadly about the role of arms control in world politics", and will find itself sharing the same concerns as the USSR in respect of weapons and technology proliferation. Offers guidelines for US foreign policy (1) set realistic goals (2) co-operate with a reforming USSR while taking steps to reduce the risk of deteriorating relations should a counter-reformation occur.
Calls for a more pragmatic judgment of the technological implications of military trends. Reviews significance of strategic defence, ICBMs and counterforce, targeting, basing, SLBMs and cruise missiles. Recommends "specific bilateral agreements and judicious unilateral choices in force modernization".

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