Offers "an argument for the necessity of an historical perspective" in the analysis of Soviet conduct, tracing the competition between Soviet communism and Soviet state nationalism from 1917 to the present day, with Stalin's purges of 1937-39 seen as the turning point -- "the rise of a state, rather than party, bureaucracy". Soviet conduct since WW2 has been dominated by geo-political considerations, not ideology. The American perception of an ideologically-driven Soviet Union is dangerous.
John Lukacs has for over 30 years written extensively on modern history, most recently in Outgrowing Democracy: A History of the United States in the Twentieth Century (1984). He is Professor of History at Chestnut Hill College in Philadelphia.
Sixty-five years ago the Soviet state came formally into existence —at a time when the United States had chosen isolationism, at least in regard to Europe. The avowed purpose of the Soviet Union was to serve as the center of communist internationalism—yet at a time when Lenin was forced to opt for a policy of isolation, at least in regard to Europe. By 1921, however, the discrepancy between Soviet priorities, between state and ideological interests, had already begun.
By 1939 the world situation had changed dramatically. After 20 years of relative isolation, both the Soviet Union and the United States were returning to the European scene. By the end of 1942 it appeared that they would become the two principal world powers after the Second World War. And whereas during the war, and as late as 1945, the Soviet Union was seen by the American government as a (if not the) principal ally of the United States, by 1947 the American government was constrained to view it as the principal adversary of the United States: a condition which has, by and large, remained unchanged during the last 40 years. In July 1947, under the pseudonym of "X," George F. Kennan published an article in Foreign Affairs entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which set forth the rationale of an American foreign policy that had crystallized at the time. I shall—very briefly—return to Kennan’s analysis at the end of this essay. The main purpose of this essay is, however, that of a survey of the development of Soviet "conduct" 65 years after the establishment of the Soviet state.
II
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
"The historical nature and development of Finnish-Russian relations... should tell us not only some things about Finland but also some seldom-recognized things about Russian foreign policy under Stalin".
With exclusive access to newly opened Soviet records, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali reveal that Kennedy blinked too soon and Khrushchev declared victory.
Russia's interests demand good relations with everyone, but older, darker forces tempt it to avenge its fall from superpowerdom. Westernizing democrats govern for now, but ex-communist elites and embittered generals scheme to re invigorate the military and reassert control over the borderlands. Their machinations are creating a fault line across the oil-rich Caucasus and Central Asia. For Russia to neglect its reconstruction to pursue the illusion of power would be a monumental mistake. While the expansion of NATO is misconceived, the West must not encourage Russian hard-liners with unmerited concessions.
