Offers "an argument for the necessity of an historical perspective" in the analysis of Soviet conduct, tracing the competition between Soviet communism and Soviet state nationalism from 1917 to the present day, with Stalin's purges of 1937-39 seen as the turning point -- "the rise of a state, rather than party, bureaucracy". Soviet conduct since WW2 has been dominated by geo-political considerations, not ideology. The American perception of an ideologically-driven Soviet Union is dangerous.
John Lukacs has for over 30 years written extensively on modern history, most recently in Outgrowing Democracy: A History of the United States in the Twentieth Century (1984). He is Professor of History at Chestnut Hill College in Philadelphia.
Sixty-five years ago the Soviet state came formally into existence —at a time when the United States had chosen isolationism, at least in regard to Europe. The avowed purpose of the Soviet Union was to serve as the center of communist internationalism—yet at a time when Lenin was forced to opt for a policy of isolation, at least in regard to Europe. By 1921, however, the discrepancy between Soviet priorities, between state and ideological interests, had already begun.
By 1939 the world situation had changed dramatically. After 20 years of relative isolation, both the Soviet Union and the United States were returning to the European scene. By the end of 1942 it appeared that they would become the two principal world powers after the Second World War. And whereas during the war, and as late as 1945, the Soviet Union was seen by the American government as a (if not the) principal ally of the United States, by 1947 the American government was constrained to view it as the principal adversary of the United States: a condition which has, by and large, remained unchanged during the last 40 years. In July 1947, under the pseudonym of "X," George F. Kennan published an article in Foreign Affairs entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which set forth the rationale of an American foreign policy that had crystallized at the time. I shall—very briefly—return to Kennan’s analysis at the end of this essay. The main purpose of this essay is, however, that of a survey of the development of Soviet "conduct" 65 years after the establishment of the Soviet state.
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