Sets out the development of the GDR-FRG relationship since 1979. The GDR has achieved a new status in the relationship, and is now in a position to drive harder bargains.
A. James McAdams is an assistant professor of politics at Princeton University, specializing in Soviet, East European and German affairs. He would like to thank Richard H. Ullman and the Princeton International Relations Study Group for their helpful comments.
No one can deny that relations between the two German states have taken a remarkable and largely unexpected turn for the better in recent years. At least since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, the two states have sought to preserve a sheltered island of détente amid the high tensions between the superpowers. For onlookers in the West long accustomed to clichés about East Berlin’s hostility to the whole détente process, it was altogether startling in September 1983 to find General Secretary Erich Honecker calling for the formation of a "coalition of reason" with his old enemies in the Federal Republic (FRG), even after Bonn had signaled its support for the modernization of NATO’s European missile system. But it was equally striking to find in West Germany a new coalition government led by Christian Democrats, formed in the fall of 1982, that was unabashedly receptive to Honecker’s overtures. Certainly, few observers had anticipated Bonn’s negotiation of two enormous bank loans to East Germany in 1983 and 1984, let alone the scarcely concealed enthusiasm of conservative leaders like Chancellor Helmut Kohl for Honecker’s plans to make an official visit to West Germany in the near future.
Was there emerging, as many Western analysts began to suggest, a new attitude toward the old German question? Commentators on the sidelines were quick to point out what was not happening between the two Germanies: the maintenance of good relations between the two countries had nothing to do with an ideological rapprochement of socialism and capitalism; nor was either of the Germanies motivated by the prospect of an imminent reunification. By all accounts, the present generation of West German leaders, more realistic than its predecessor, seems to have accepted the fact that national reunification is at best a very distant possibility.
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
Europe's great drive toward unification can distract attention from the liberal order that already exists in most of the continent. But this extraordinary achievement is itself threatened precisely as a result of Europe's forced march to unity, especially Helmut Kohl's push for European monetary union. Europe's leaders set the wrong priority after 1989 by neglecting the east and federalizing the west. They fiddled in Maastricht while Sarajevo burned. Europeans should instead consolidate and spread across the continent the order that already exists. It provides for security and liberty; more would be less.
Daniel Goldhagen's book on the Holocaust--condemning the German "eliminationist" mindset toward Jews--has become an international bestseller and a datum in German-American relations. Pity, because it is a simplistic, monocausal, and unhistorical explanation of one of the most complex horrors in history. For Goldhagen, as for the Nazis, Hitler is Germany.
The rationale of West German foreign policy is very simple: the postwar era has ended. Its hallmarks were high hopes for Western political structures on the one hand, and high tension between East and West on the other. Now a new epoch is in the offing. In the West it is going to be characterized by less ambitious objectives and more pragmatic approaches. The achievements of the fifties and sixties will not be dismantled, but the aims for the immediate future will be lowered. Dreams of "Atlantic Union Now" or "Instant Europe" must give way to expectations more closely geared to realities: wider and deeper coöperation, without necessarily institutional perfection. Between East and West the new era could be one of diminished tension and growing détente, of more coöperation and less confrontation. Not unlike President Nixon, the Bonn government is also trying to "build agreement upon agreement" without in any way deluding itself that this could be a process easily or speedily accomplished.
