The United States and Libya

U.S.-Libyan relations have come "pretty darn close" to war, Secretary of State George Shultz said recently. In 1981, just four months into office, President Reagan closed Libya’s embassy in Washington, citing Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi’s support for international terrorism. Shortly afterward, U.S. navy jets shot down two Libyan warplanes after being fired upon by them. American pressure reached dramatic intensity last April 15 with the bombing raid on Qaddafi’s headquarters and home in Tripoli. Later, some officials sought to destabilize Qaddafi with deliberate plants of disinformation.

If the ouster of Qaddafi has not been the Administration’s avowed goal, it clearly has become a virtual obsession. "If a coup takes place, that is all to the good," said Shultz in April, in a rare example of an American cabinet official in effect advocating the overthrow of another government. At the core of the Administration’s pressure on Qaddafi is a belief that, by dealing with him, the United States will lead the Western world in dealing a fatal blow to the promoters of international terrorism.

Indeed, the April 1986 raid on Libya brought a lull in Arab-related terrorism. And the governments of Western Europe, scarcely supportive of the American show of force, nevertheless imposed sanctions, in part to placate the Americans. The sanctions prompted the departure of more than 600 Libyans from Western Europe, thus dismantling a logistical network for terror.

But developments since the bombing raid have raised questions about the effectiveness of American policy. Inside Libya Qaddafi overcame what many around him said was a state of depression. After the raid he reemerged in public on September 1 with a forceful speech celebrating his 17th anniversary in power. He began the speech "America is filth." The next day he defied predictions of a coup by sitting openly in an armchair reviewing a military parade for more than one hour.

The lull in terrorism was short-lived. In September terrorists seized a Pan American plane in Karachi, shot up a synagogue in Istanbul and went on a bombing spree in Paris. Some American officials saw a Libyan hand in Karachi. But there was no definitive proof, and the focus of international pressures shifted to other promoters of terrorism.