Assesses the status of revolutionary forces in Central America, arguing that none will be successful. Catholicism and conservatism have deeper roots than Marxism. Domino theory will not be demonstrated. Rebels in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala are unpopular and ineffective. Explains that US containment is the reason why the role of the USSR and its allies has been only one of assisting in defence and economic development of Nicaragua, and has been circumspect and miserly about activities in Central America. Continued US military reaction without diplomatic efforts will only de-stabilize the region.
Clifford Krauss covers Central American and Caribbean affairs for The Wall Street Journal. He has reported on the region since 1977.
On President Reagan’s first inauguration day, revolution appeared to be spreading across Central America. The Sandinistas were consolidating their hold over Nicaragua and guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala were on the move. Americans began thinking that Central America could become "another Vietnam." Six years later, Central America is going much better for Washington than Southeast Asia did—and with much less effort. Revolution has not spread, and the leftist guerrillas of Central America are not faring well, without the deployment of U.S. troops.
II
To assess the current status of revolutionary forces in Central America and U.S. policies for dealing with them, one must begin with Nicaragua. The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua has not been overthrown, but it has been contained. The Sandinistas, with their huge army and highly effective security and intelligence apparatus and their reservoir of youthful support, will not be overthrown anytime in the foreseeable future unless the United States decides to mount an all-out war. The Nicaraguan rebels have been unable to dislodge the Sandinistas, and by year’s end the U.S. policy of backing them was the subject of renewed controversy in Washington.
In fact, the most important developments concerning Nicaragua in 1986 occurred in Washington, where, after a high-pitched public campaign by the Administration, President Reagan finally convinced Congress to go along with his policy of giving military aid to the rebel forces. On June 25 the House of Representatives approved $100 million in aid for the Nicaraguan rebels.
The White House version of Central American affairs, as stated by President Reagan in a nationally televised address on March 16, 1986, warned the American people of "a mounting danger in Central America that threatens the security of the United States. This danger will not go away; it will grow worse, if we fail to take action now." Furthermore, he said, "Using Nicaragua as a base, the Soviets and Cubans can become the dominant power in the crucial corridor between North and South America. Established there, they will be in a position to threaten the Panama Canal, interdict our vital Caribbean sealanes and ultimately move against Mexico."
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Recent and forthcoming elections in key Latin American countries come at a time when US relations with many states in the region are particularly uncertain. Discusses six areas which should be addressed by policy-makers (1) the debt crisis (2) the need for co-operation between the USA, Europe, Canada and Latin American countries in ending Central America's wars (3) support of democratic institutions (4) the drug problem (5) the need to rebuild inter-American institutions (6) relations with Mexico and Panama. Concludes that too much attention has been devoted to Nicaragua at the expense of greater concerns, although straightforward solutions are unlikely. Former US ambassador to the Organization of American States, and co-negotiator of the Panama Canal treaties. A substantial criticism of Reagan's policy in Central and South America, and interesting for its view of both regions as one.
Covers US foreign policy in Latin America during 1988, discussing (1) Nicaragua (2) Panama and the Noriega problem (3) drug trafficking (4) the progress towards democracy (5) the debt crisis. Concludes that future US policy will have to centre around Mexico and the Caribbean basin, but that this should not obscure America's long-term interest in a steadily-improving economic situation throughout Latin America.
The USA maintains that its aim is for a peaceful settlement in Nicaragua in a regional context that advances the prospects for democracy, protects the interests of the Contras and preserves US strategic interests. These goals involve a potentially long and difficult process. The accord concluded by the Central American Presidents in Aug 1987 by no means ensures peace. The practical question facing the USA is how to preserve its commitment to the Contras while still influencing the negotiating process.

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