Poland 1939-1947
Two young scholars have combined forces, and yoked together their doctoral theses, to produce an account of how Poland's geopolitical fate was determined in the 1940s. Although parts of the subject have been more extensively explored by others, it is the best overall treatment of these events in English. The story of the internal political struggles, based largely on Polish historical publications discriminatingly used, illustrates many aspects little known in the West. Questions remain concerning the Soviet role, and particularly the strategy and decisions of Stalin himself-questions that may never be answered.
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Try to imagine, as Western specialists in communist affairs often do, a Politburo meeting in the Kremlin. It is the spring of 1981, the topic is Poland. Comrade A is impatient: "I thought Kania was one of us. He used to be in charge of their security forces. How is it he doesn't know what to do?" Comrade B is philosophical: "These Poles, they've never liked us, they never will. We liberate them from the Germans, we sell them cheap oil, we give them credit, we buy everything they can't sell in the West. What do we get? Why aren't they grateful?" Comrade C is bitter: "I'm sick and tired of all these East Europeans, but especially of the Poles. They want to be the bridge' between us and the West. (Laughter in the room.) Don't they know we want the West Germans to be the bridge'?" (More laughter.) Comrade D is business-like: "We have better things to do than to worry about Poland all the time. I move that we give this Kania fellow another chance. If he doesn't have everything under control by the end of the year, we'll move in. We'll call it fraternal assistance.' Enough is enough. What will the Americans and the Chinese think of us if we let this thing go on indefinitely? We're patient, of course. We're always patient, but we're not a paper tiger!" The motion carries.
In Central Europe the greatest threat to democracy comes not from the nationalists but from the better-organized former communist parties. Encouraging Western-style conservative parties would provide economic and political competition.
The Clinton administration needs to lead Europe and expand NATO, but without harming ties with Russia. Washington should dispel the ambiguity created by its current waffling. The president must take a two-track approach: start the process of accepting Central European states into NATO by spelling out criteria for membership and sign a global security treaty with Russia. To make it work, Germany and Poland will have to reconcile, the West and Russia will have to soothe Ukraine, and the problem of the Baltics will have to be finessed. Only American leadership can help create a wider, safer Europe for the next century.

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