A Nuclear Test Ban

Nuclear detonations are constant reminders of mankind’s capacity for violence. It is not surprising that people and governments conclude that if this symptom of supreme violence were exercised, the risk of nuclear war itself would diminish. Even though this position has psychological force and strong popular appeal, it bears deeper examination.

At issue is whether the single, radical step of ending all nuclear weapons testing, given the uncertainty of detecting lower-yield tests, is the best route to stopping the qualitative strategic arms race. Can such a step be pursued as an independent goal without linkages to other kinds of arms control and disarmament? Or are there more promising ways of restraining testing than its total elimination? In addressing this last question we need to examine the essential issues in the current debate and analyze current approaches. Then we can sketch a phased approach to a regime that would respond to most of the issues raised and secure the traditional goals of a comprehensive test ban (CTB) treaty, provided that it is embedded in a broad commitment to arms control.

II

The Soviet government’s position, from the first serious discussion of this matter in the U.N. Disarmament Commission in 1957 until the Reykjavik summit in late 1986, was that banning nuclear tests should be negotiated independently of other arms control measures. In 1957 this took the form of demanding a temporary moratorium (to allow negotiation of a total ban) as an immediate step, independent of disarmament. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev took the same tack in July 1985 when he urged immediate negotiation of a CTB during a testing moratorium that the Soviets were about to initiate. It was evident that the Soviets felt that such a ban could be arrived at "in a matter of months." As late as September 1986 Gorbachev asked that "talks in any form—bilateral, tripartite or multilateral, and moreover without linkage to any other questions—be resumed or started."