CONTAINMENT: 40 Years Later : Introduction
found hereOpens a group of essays on the theme of US foreign-policy concept called "containment," with special attention to the provenance of George Kennan's The Sources of Soviet Conducted, first published in 1947 under the psuedonym "X". The full groupIn addition to the following two items, the group comprises (1) a reprint on pp. 852-868 of Kennan's article 'The sources of Soviet conduct', published under the pseudomyn 'X' in the FA issue of Jul 1947 (2) a reprinted excerpt on pp869-884 from Walter Lippmann 'The cold war: a study in US foreign policy' (Harper, 1947), pouring cold water on (a) Kennan's notion that Soviet socialism "bears within itself the seeds of its own decay" (b) his recommendation of an open-ended policy of passivity in the expectation of Soviet change of heart, pressing instead for active pressure on the USSR to withdraw from Eastern Europe. full references and data sources for this article can be found here.
William Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.
Forty years ago, in the pages of this journal, there appeared an extraordinary article that changed American foreign policy. Its title was "The Sources of Soviet Conduct"; written by George F. Kennan, it was first published under the pseudonym of "X." It was a closely reasoned, elegantly drafted analysis of Soviet foreign policy, its motives and ambitions. Perhaps more important, the article presented a strong prescription for American policy. Kennan argued that compared to the West, Russia was still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy was highly flexible, and that "Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential." He concluded:
This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.
This brief passage defined the doctrine of containment as the fundamental American approach to the Soviet Union. The policy was in fact already evolving in the Truman Administration, but Kennan gave it an intellectual and analytical framework and brought it to public attention. The author’s true identity was quickly discovered (though not acknowledged until 1951), and the American press began to hail a new policy. Arthur Krock, then a reporter for The New York Times, cited the article as authoritative, public evidence that the Truman Administration was adopting Kennan’s policy recommendations after "appeasement of the Kremlin proved a failure."
As the discussion broadened and the author’s stature became understood, the secretary of state, George C. Marshall, summoned Kennan, whom he had just named director of the new Policy Planning Staff, and with "raised eyebrows" inquired about the article. The last thing Marshall had expected, Kennan later noted in his memoirs, was that his new policy planner would have his name bandied about in the press as the author of a "programmatical article, on the greatest of American foreign policy problems." His point made, Marshall never raised the matter again with Kennan.
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American policy toward the Soviet Union has been replete with examples of incoherence and inconsistency. Responding in part to Soviet moves and in part to the political competition inherent in our democratic politics, American attitudes have alternated between overemphasis and underemphasis on the threatening nature of the Soviet Union. The result has been inconsistent policy and missed opportunities.
Asks (1) why the postwar Soviet thrust for hegemony over Western Eurasia seemed a possible dream to Moscow (2) why the US reaction came so late. Answers that (1) it involved mixed impulses of fear and ambition deeply rooted in Russia's history, ideology and technological capacity (2) US foreign policy had a strong antagonism to the Old World balance-of-power politics. This came to an end with the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan. But the cold war which ensued will have a 'soft landing' rather than turn hot, because the USSR is not a great power in the new technological and educational revolutions which will be the bases of power in the future. The problems are now how to harness the new bases of power and how to prevent any one state from achieving hegemony. This picture of the modern world, largely constructed and painted by the USA, is slowly being perceived by the USSR.
The Reagan Administration is repeating the first beat of a familiar rhythm of America's international and political life. Each newly elected Administration of the alternative political party launches its foreign relations with themes that were developed during the national campaign in opposition to the policies of its predecessor. But then comes the down beat: unexpected domestic and international conditions contradict (or appear to contradict) the underlying premises of the "new" foreign policy. Then either the Administration abandons or modifies its themes (in substance, if not in rhetoric) or it takes uncontested credit for the transformation. This phenomenon began with the Eisenhower Administration. It has deep roots in the American political system and the American approach to the outside world.
