Managing Nuclear Operations
The new wave in strategic analysis is reflected by this hefty volume. There was a time when strategists were mainly concerned with the traditional counting and weighing of nuclear forces to determine the balance, and who had the advantage. As fears of a "bolt out of the blue" have faded, interest has shifted to the "management" of forces, which is broadly defined to include the how and why of nuclear strategy. Unfortunately, the technical nature of the subject leaves the lay reader further and further behind (there are five pages of abbreviations and acronyms). Among the many erudite essays, a few nuggets stand out. The Soviets, according to Stephen Meyer, would prefer a first-strike strategy but lack confidence in it, and therefore Moscow has more or less adopted a strategy of preemption. In the event of nuclear war or a nuclear crisis, there is a built-in tension between the strategist who wants great flexibility, and the actual command systems which tend in the other direction-that of limiting options. Theodore Jarvis concludes that while strategic defenses on both sides would complicate planning for an offensive strike, the existence of strategic defense would perforce mean granting some degree of automation in the decision to use weapons. A great paradox is that delegating authority to use nuclear weapons may increase deterrence, while maintaining all authority in one central place (i.e., with the president) could create vulnerabilities.
Related
The Clinton administration supports crippling economic sanctions that punish the Iraqi people but seems ready to live with the demise of international inspections to monitor Saddam Hussein's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Washington has it exactly backward. It should offer Baghdad a blunt trade: lightened sanctions in return for renewed, intrusive arms inspections. The sweeping sanctions regime does nothing to advance U.S. interests, undermine Saddam, or contain Iraq. Leaving Saddam's arsenal unwatched is folly. Better to have arms inspections without sanctions than sanctions without arms inspections.
As Cold War threats have diminished, so-called weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles -- have become the new international bugbears. The irony is that the harm caused by these weapons pales in comparison to the havoc wreaked by a much more popular tool: economic sanctions. Tally up the casualties caused by rogue states, terrorists, and unconventional weapons, and the number is surprisingly small. The same cannot be said for deaths inflicted by international sanctions. The math is sobering and should lead the United States to reconsider its current policy of strangling Iraq.
A raft of new books confronts a very real threat--the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction--and propose vital, though moderate, responses.

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